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HARMONIZING CURRENT THREATS: USING THE OUTCRY 
FOR LEGAL EDUCATION REFORMS TO TAKE ANOTHER 
LOOK AT CIVIL GIDEON AND WHAT IT MEANS TO BE AN 
AMERICAN LAWYER 
 
Cathryn Miller-Wilson
* 
 
 
Drawing from the broad and varied literature on legal ethics, this paper 
demonstrates that legal education and access to justice concerns can and 
should be addressed simultaneously in our current political and economic 
climate. Current threats to legal education, and to lawyering in general, pre-
sent an opportunity for legal education transformation. Applying legal ethics 
theory to an analysis of these threats provides support for the creation of 
teaching law firms, similar in size and scope to teaching hospitals, that will 
employ clinical teaching methodology, substantially enhance ethics teaching 
and significantly address the issue of access to justice. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Since my law school days, I have thought about the medical 
school education model. I had struggled with a relatively confusing le-
gal education that failed to bridge the gap between “thinking like a 
lawyer” and actually practicing law, despite a clinical course, extern-
ships, summer jobs, and voluntary student projects. Wouldn’t it be 
wonderful, I thought, to have had the opportunity after receiving my 
J.D., to practice in a teaching law firm—like a teaching hospital—a 
large supervised setting with many rotations? Through live client rep-
resentation, I could rotate through a variety of substantive areas, hav-
ing myriad opportunities to represent clients in a diverse array of con-
texts. I would not only be able to utilize such an intensive experience 
to bridge the theory/practice gap, but also to be exposed to a wide va-
riety of areas before having to specialize.  
 
                                                          
*
 Cathryn Miller-Wilson is a Visiting Assistant Professor at Villanova School 
of Law where she co-teaches the Civil Justice Clinic. An earlier version of this paper 
was presented at the October 2012 Society for American Law Teachers Conference: 
“Teaching Social Justice, Expanding Access to Justice: The Role of Legal Education 
& The Legal Profession” at the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School 
of Law in Baltimore, MD. I am grateful for wonderful research assistance to Donald 
Zeman and Renee Nolan both of Villanova. I am also grateful for comments and 
feedback given to me by Villanova junior faculty colleagues and Professor Emerita 
of Philosophy, Marjorie C. Miller. 
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Over the years, I mentioned these musings to friends and col-
leagues, many of whom agreed that such a model would be interesting 
and perhaps better than existing models. Ultimately, however, the con-
versation always turned to two seemingly intractable problems: 1) the 
cost of such a venture was too prohibitive to make it worth pursuing 
beyond a casual conversation and 2) ultimately, the analogy between 
hospitals and law firms failed because the nature of the work was too 
different.  
 
Meanwhile, while I mused, I practiced public interest law. I 
was fortunate to spend the better part of seventeen years providing le-
gal assistance to those who truly needed it. During those years, I 
learned hard lessons about how difficult it is to practice public interest 
law: how enormous the need is and how small the available resources 
are. While I practiced, the resources shrunk and the need grew. In my 
own small world, I tried to expand the capacity of our agency’s ability 
to serve by developing mentoring programs and providing training for 
pro bono volunteers, supervising certified legal interns, and collaborat-
ing with other public interest agencies to try to share the workload. I 
tried to get fellowships for my agency so that we could hire more law-
yers, and I, along with my colleagues, participated annually in letter-
writing campaigns for donations and fundraising events for our agen-
cy. At the end of every fiscal year, after reviewing the growing num-
bers of clients and legal matters that our agency handled, we discussed 
the funding cuts and what we were going to do about them. Federal 
and state funders were constantly attacking legal services, and it didn’t 
feel as if things could get any bleaker. 
 
Then the financial crisis hit. Thousands of people lost their jobs 
and, consequently, their health insurance; their sources of income; and 
their ability to pay their utility bills, rent, or mortgages.
1
 We saw many 
more homeless clients. Our clients were sicker, and their access to 
health care became increasingly difficult. They had trouble keeping 
their utilities on and difficulty obtaining the money necessary to come 
to our offices, keep their medical appointments, or pay the co-pays for 
their medications. Surely, we thought, the time has come for the gov-
                                                          
1
 Michael D. Hurd & Susann Rohwedder, Effects of the Financial Crisis and 
Great Recession on American Households 20 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 16407, 2010), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16407; 
Press Release, Public Agenda, Four in 10 Americans Struggle to Pay the Bills, Anx-
ious About Maintaining Middle Class Life (Feb. 3, 2011), available at 
http://www.publicagenda.org/files/pdf/struggling-in-america-press-release.pdf.  
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ernment to recognize the importance of legal services. However, that 
dream was not to be. The funding cuts continued as the federal and 
state government dealt with the fall-out of the financial crises and their 
own shrinking budgets.
2
 
 
In the midst of all of this, the financial crisis hit law firms and 
law schools. Suddenly, legal education and its connection—or lack 
thereof—to law jobs was in the news constantly. Corporations that had 
suffered great financial hits since 2008 were no longer willing to pay 
exorbitant fees for new “untrained” lawyers.3 Jobless graduates and 
frustrated firms turned to the law schools to demand greater accounta-
bility. 
 
I saw an opportunity. What if all of these phenomena—the le-
gal services crisis, the law firm changes, the legal education criti-
cisms—could be viewed as parts of a whole? If connections could be 
drawn between a variety of legal system failures and legal education, 
perhaps it could be argued that the time had come to make legal educa-
tion a public responsibility. And if that time had come, perhaps the po-
litical will could be found to support legal education financially and to 
assist law schools in developing a teaching law firm that would: 1) 
tremendously expand the legal resources available to the indigent; 2) 
enhance ethical training for lawyers by creating an environment that 
produced live ethical issues and the time and space to explore them 
with colleagues and professors, and through theoretical readings relat-
ed to the dilemmas that they faced in their representation; 3) provide a 
diverse array of rotations that would permit new lawyers to experience 
several substantive legal areas, gaining practical experience without 
leaving behind the opportunity to continue their theoretical legal edu-
cation; and 4) create jobs for practitioner law-professors, providing an 
expansion of the legal marketplace. 
 
This paper makes the argument that, as with medical education 
after the 1950s, it is time to take public responsibility for legal educa-
tion.
4
 Medical education, as traced by William Rothstein, changed a 
                                                          
2
 Press Release, Legal Services Corp., House-Senate Agreement Cuts LSC 
Funding (Nov. 15, 2011), available at http://www.lsc.gov/media/press-
releases/house-senate-agreement-cuts-lsc-funding. 
3
 Ashby Jones & Joseph Palazzolo, What’s a First-Year Lawyer Worth?, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2011, at B1.  
4
 WILLIAM G. ROTHSTEIN, AMERICAN MEDICAL SCHOOLS AND THE PRACTICE 
OF MEDICINE: A HISTORY 224–25 (1987). 
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great deal after 1950 in large part because of the advances in medicine, 
which created greater public need and support for public funding.
5
  As 
one famous physician and medical educator noted in 1953:  
 
It is increasingly the opinion of all medical edu-
cators that the financial support of our medical 
schools is inadequate, particularly if the needs 
of the nation for health and medical services are 
to be met in a manner consistent with our ex-
panding body of scientific knowledge and the 
demands of our people.
6
  
 
While there has not been an “expanding body” of legal knowledge, 
there certainly has been a tremendous increase in the number and 
complexity of our laws.
7
 The need for a legal representative in civil lit-
igation contexts has risen dramatically, along with the direness of the 
consequences of proceeding without a lawyer.
8
 The current level of 
public financial support for legal services is insufficient and, as I ar-
gue, will remain so unless the funding is connected not only to the 
provision of legal services but also to educating future lawyers.  
 
At the very least, using philosopher and legal ethicist David 
Luban’s conception of the morally activist lawyer,9 I believe that law-
yers and their regulatory institutions should take greater responsibility 
for solving the current crisis in poverty legal services delivery by mar-
rying it to the issues in legal education that exist today. As I discuss in 
greater detail below, if lawyers make resolving these issues together a 
priority, lawyers can use their powers of persuasion to convince the 
public of the value of supporting legal education’s transformation. 
 
To make the case for public support of the creation of teaching 
law firms, I start with two assumptions that, for purposes of this paper, 
I will hold as truisms: 1) access to justice for all in this country is at an 
all-time low and 2) legal education, as we have known it for the past 
                                                          
5
 Id. 
6
 Id. at 179 (quoting Ward Darley). 
7
 Over-Regulated America: The Home of Laissez-Faire is Being Suffocated by 
Excessive and Badly Written Regulation, ECONOMIST, Feb. 18, 2012 at 9. 
8
 Russell Engler, Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon: What Exist-
ing Data Reveal About When Counsel Is Most Needed, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 37, 
41 (2010). 
9
 See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY xxii (1988). 
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roughly one hundred years, is problematic and needs to be “fixed.” 
There is a great deal of debate about the nature and extent of the “fix” 
that is necessary, but I will focus narrowly on the debates regarding 
ethical education of lawyers and the call for more “practice ready” 
lawyers. 
 
This is not to say that I agree with every critic: I do not think 
law schools need to be more akin to trade schools and less venues for 
pondering legal theory,
10
 nor do I think that law school needs to be 
simply cheaper or simply shorter as many have written.
11
 I believe 
deeply in the value of well-rounded education, both generally and for 
the effective lawyer. What both sides in the practice/theory debate 
seem to continually miss is the importance of mastering the theoretical 
understanding of law and its practical application for both the theoreti-
cian and the practitioner. Failing to take some time to experience law 
in action diminishes a necessary real-world understanding of how the 
theories developed in the classroom actually function and what one 
can learn from that experience and re-apply in the classroom. Similar-
ly, failing to ground what one is seeing and doing in theory leaves one 
unable to broaden and deepen one’s experience and to learn from it. 
For these reasons, my proposal involves the creation of a post-J.D. 
teaching law firm that marries experiential and theoretical pedagogies 
in an effort to teach future practicing lawyers how to apply the theory 
that they’ve already learned to real-world practice situations and to re-
                                                          
10
 See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Think Like a Lawyer, Work Like a Machine: The 
Dissonance Between Law School and Law Practice, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1236 
(1991) (arguing that teaching the “practice of law” has been removed from the law 
school curriculum, leaving graduates unprepared for legal practice); Harry T. Ed-
wards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 
91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 34 (1992) (positing that emphasis on theory rather than ethical 
practice has called into question the practice of law as an “honorable profession”). 
11
 See, e.g., Richard A. Matasar, Does the Current Economic Model of Legal 
Education Work for Law Schools, Law Firms (or Anyone Else)?, 82 N.Y. ST. B.A. J., 
Oct. 2010, at 20, 21 (discussing rising costs of legal education and how it exacer-
bates economic plight of students unable to attain sufficient post-graduation em-
ployment); Preble Stolz, The Two-Year Law School: The Day the Music Died, 25 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 37, 39–40 (1973) (discussing the attempts and failure to create two-
year law schools); Christopher T. Cunniffe, The Case for the Alternative Third-Year 
Program, 61 ALB. L. REV. 85, 129–30  (1997) (arguing for an “alternative third-year 
program” where “students may receive compensation for externship experience”); 
Mitu Gulati, Richard Sander & Robert Sockloskie, The Happy Charade: An Empiri-
cal Examination of the Third Year of Law School, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 235, 266 
(2001) (critiquing third year of law school as “largely irrelevant”). 
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ceive continual grounding in theory throughout their experiential edu-
cation. Therefore, discussions about legal education reform prior to 
obtaining a J.D. degree are beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
This is not to suggest that traditional law schools should remain 
exactly as they are. Borrowing from general conceptions of strategic 
planning theory, however, I believe it is most effective to start with the 
end goal and work backwards. The legal education reform discussion 
therefore starts with the question: What are the goals of legal educa-
tion? Many suggest the answer is that the goals are and should be 
broader than “simply” teaching people how to become lawyers. The 
problem with this response is not that it is untrue or even true only for 
a small subset of law school graduates. It is that it reduces the art and 
science of effective lawyering to some kind of simplistic definition 
unworthy of legal education’s focus. If we can agree that learning ef-
fective, ethical lawyering thought processes, practices, and skills is 
complex, multi-faceted, and useful in both a utilitarian and philosophi-
cal sense, then it is not difficult to agree that teaching effective lawyer-
ing thought processes, practices, and skills is a goal for legal educa-
tion. It is this very complexity of what it means to become an effective 
lawyer that law schools have struggled to address. In an effort to try to 
discover why this struggle has been so difficult for us, it is useful to 
look to other analogously complex professions, such as the medical 
one, to determine how they resolve or attempt to resolve this struggle.  
 
Because this paper proposes a teaching law firm modeled after 
a teaching hospital, some discussion of medical education in general 
will be helpful to an understanding of why this particular model is one 
that I am proposing for addressing both the access to justice issue and 
the legal education crisis. Regarding the education issue alone, medi-
cal education has within it a very similar debate raging between theory 
and practice, framed as a debate between scientific research and ap-
plied medicine. Therefore, an examination of their efforts to resolve 
the seeming conflict between the two will help our discussion. 
 
The questions that I address are: first, why should we, as law-
yers, make access to justice not simply a concern but a central concern, 
so that part of our definition of effective lawyering includes a lawyer 
who is actively engaged in trying to solve the access to justice prob-
lem? Related to this question is what this problem has to do with legal 
education. In Part I of this Article, I explore the connections between 
access to justice, legal education, and ethical theories of lawyers’ role. 
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Second, if I have persuaded you that ensuring access to justice 
is actually an obligation, rather than merely an aspiration, of an effec-
tive lawyer, then how do we address this concern, whether effective 
lawyer-practitioners, lawyer-professors, lawyer-policymakers, or law-
yer-entrepreneurs? My proposal is that we address the concern through 
the creation of a teaching law firm. Part II of my Article focuses on the 
medical education model—specifically the incorporation of teaching 
hospitals into its overall educational scheme—and whether there is a 
way, despite the obvious differences, to make this model translatable 
into a legal education model. To an extent, this section focuses on 
medical pedagogy and the effectiveness of the teaching hospital in ad-
dressing both the problems of access to quality health care for the poor 
and ensuring that our health care providers are effective. I also survey 
the literature about the research scientist versus practicing doctor de-
bate. From there, we can determine what pedagogies would be most 
useful to emulate in the legal education context and describe the de-
tails of our teaching law firm. 
 
Third, how we can create the teaching law firm? Part III of this 
Article addresses the inevitable economic question of how we can sus-
tain a teaching law firm. Having provided the theoretical justifications 
for lawyers’ responsibilities for addressing the access to justice issue 
and teaching and learning a new conception of ethical lawyering in 
Part I, and the educational justifications for discharging these respon-
sibilities by supporting and creating a teaching law firm in Part II, 
what are the economic justifications and practical considerations for 
seeking and using government support for this? Embedded in the ques-
tion of practical considerations are the concerns, which I will also ad-
dress, about the real differences between lawyering and doctoring and 
how those differences impact a legal education proposal that is mod-
eled after a medical one. 
 
I. THE “MORALLY ACTIVIST” LAWYER AND THE ACCESS  
TO JUSTICE ISSUE  
 
I start by introducing a radical re-conception of lawyering and 
lawyers’ role created and described by philosopher and legal ethicist, 
David Luban, in his 1988 book Lawyers and Justice.
12
 I am interested 
in this re-conception not only because I am intellectually sympathetic 
with the theory, but also because it has captured my imagination in 
                                                          
12
 LUBAN, supra note 9, at xxii. 
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thinking about how this re-conceptualization could be taught and what 
kinds of differences the teaching of this theory could make for lawyers 
and the justice system. 
 
As stated in his introduction, Luban wrote the book in an effort 
to respond to societal complaints about the public perceptions of the 
disconnect between law and justice.
13
 Interested in debunking this 
claim and finding a way to reconnect law and justice, he examines 
lawyers and lawyering in two parts. In the first half of the book, he de-
tails and challenges the dominant picture, or “standard conception,” of 
lawyering—one that is based on three principles: 1) the theory of role 
morality (dealing with conflicts between “role morality” and “common 
morality”); 2) the adversary system excuse (excusing lawyers from 
common moral obligations to non-clients because of their duties to 
their own clients); and 3) the standard conception of lawyers’ role 
(consisting of the principles of non-accountability and partisanship).
14
  
 
Note that the conversation about lawyers’ role and common 
morality is a lengthy one that spans centuries and countries. I focus on 
Luban’s discussion because it is so thorough. I do not mean to suggest, 
however, that his is the only voice in the conversation advocating for a 
theory of lawyering that addresses the common conflict between law-
yer obligations of zealousness, partisanship, and even confidentiality 
on the one hand, and moral obligations to third parties and the com-
munity at large on the other.
15
 
 
Luban argues that the three principles mentioned above, which 
have formed the dominant picture of lawyers’ ethics, are not supporta-
                                                          
13
 Id. at xvii. 
14
 Id. at  xix–xx. 
15
 In fact, the discussion of a lawyer’s moral obligations conflicting with her 
other duties has been ongoing and the number of voices in the conversation is quite 
expansive. For further discussion of these topics, see generally Katherine R. Kruse, 
Lawyers, Justice and the Challenge of Moral Pluralism, 90 MINN. L. REV. 389 
(2005) (discussing a lawyer’s obligations when she morally disagrees with her cli-
ent’s actions); Russell G. Pearce, Model Rule 1.0: Lawyers are Morally Accountable, 
70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1805 (2002) (advocating a shift from amorality to moral re-
sponsibility while maintaining zealous advocacy); Elliot D. Cohen, Pure Legal Ad-
vocates and Moral Agents Revisited: A Reply to Memory and Rose, 21 CRIM. JUST. 
ETHICS 39 (2002) (arguing that lawyers’ roles of pure legal advocate and moral agent 
inherently conflict); Kay Wheat, Lawyers, Confidentiality and Public and Private 
Interests, 1 LEGAL ETHICS 184 (1998) (discussing lawyers’ duty of confidentiality 
and its repercussions to the community-at-large). 
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ble outside the context of criminal defense and must therefore be re-
placed by a different theory of lawyer ethics: “moral activism.”16 As 
he defines it, the morally activist lawyer shares and aims to share mor-
al responsibility for the ends that she is promoting in her representa-
tion and the means used to promote those ends along with her client.
17
  
In short, 
 
[T]he morally activist lawyer will challenge her 
client if the representation seems to her morally 
unworthy; she may cajole or negotiate with the 
client to change the ends or means; she may 
find herself compelled to initiate action that the 
client will view as betrayal; and she will not 
fear to quit.  She will have none of the principle 
of non-accountability, and she sees severe limi-
tations on what partisanship permits.
18
 
 
Of course not all ethicists agree with Luban. Stephen Pepper 
famously argued that the lawyers’ role is amoral and that this amorali-
ty is ethical.
19
 In doing so, he elevates client autonomy as a primary 
societal value and suggests that what lawyers do is facilitate and even 
increase client autonomy. Therefore, pursuing the client’s legal objec-
tives, without judgment, is in itself a moral good. Lawyering, as he 
states, is a means to “first class citizenship, to meaningful autonomy, 
for the client.”20 Compellingly, at first blush, he addresses the ine-
quality of access problem as a concern, but not one that requires ex-
traordinary behavior on the part of lawyers. On the contrary, Pepper 
suggests that, “transforming the amoral facilitator role of the lawyer 
into the judge/facilitator role . . . would compound inequality upon in-
equality—first the inequality of access to a lawyer, then the inequality 
of what law that particular lawyer will allow the client access to.”21  
 
There are several problems with this argument, however. First, 
Luban is not suggesting that the amoral facilitator role should be trans-
formed into the judge/facilitator role. That Luban advocates lawyers’ 
                                                          
16
 LUBAN, supra note 9, at xxii. 
17
 Id. 
18
 Id. 
19
 Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Prob-
lem, and Some Possibilities, 11 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 615–19 (1986). 
20
 Id. at 617. 
21
 Id. at 620. 
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use of moral judgment does not mean that he is advocating a transfor-
mation from lawyer to judge. It means simply that lawyers’ moral 
judgment must not be suspended in the name of effective lawyering. 
Lawyers sharing their moral judgments with their clients is not the 
same as “sitting in judgment” in the sense that Pepper seems to mean. 
 
Second, the argument that the transformation suggested by 
Pepper would compound inequality is puzzling. Whether lawyers act 
more like judges has no bearing on whether their services are available 
to those who cannot afford them. While it is possible to see a judge-
facilitator as limiting the type of legal services provided to one who 
has access, it does nothing to provide greater access to those who don’t 
have that access in the first place. 
 
Finally, as Luban suggests, Pepper’s recognition of the notion 
of first-class citizenship, a citizenship using lawyers’ assistance to take 
advantage of all that the law has to offer, undercuts his argument that 
the moral good of the increased autonomy the amoral lawyer creates 
outweighs any moral bad from the unequal distribution of access to the 
law.
22
 As is discussed in greater detail below,
23
 first-class citizenship 
implies that there are those with second-class citizenship. In other 
words, those who do not have access to lawyers do not enjoy all that 
the law has to offer. This result means that the amoral lawyer of Pep-
per’s description is one who is complicit in facilitating an inequality 
before the law. This moral bad is not outweighed by the moral good of 
facilitating autonomy in our society. 
 
Later authors, and there are almost as many as there are authors 
who came before Luban, have grappled with the notion of lawyer role 
and ethics. David Thunder, for example, discusses Pepper’s argument 
in, “Can a Good Person be a Lawyer?”24 Thunder is concerned about 
the implications of Pepper’s conception, which “places ethical blinders 
on the lawyer so restrictive that he loses the right and indeed the duty 
to take at least some responsibility for the social and moral purposes to 
which his services are put.”25 Thunder finds that Pepper’s main flaw is 
in his “implausibly demanding view of autonomy.”26 This finding is 
                                                          
22
 See LUBAN, supra note 9, at 167–68.  
23
 See infra pp. 10–11. 
24
 See generally David Thunder, Can a Good Person be a Lawyer?, 20 NOTRE 
DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 313 (2006). 
25
 Id. at 316 (emphasis in original). 
26
 Id. at 317. 
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similar to Luban’s own response to Pepper and suggests that the value 
of autonomy, although concededly important, is not often more valua-
ble than other, stronger moral considerations. 
 
Whether or not one is compelled by the theory of moral activ-
ism, it is clear that the standard conception of lawyering, including the 
principles of non-accountability (Pepper’s amoral lawyer) and parti-
sanship, has been troubling to the public, to lawyers, and to legal ethi-
cists for some time. Moral activism offers a chance to ameliorate, if 
not completely resolve, what is traditionally viewed as a conflict be-
tween professional duty and common morality. Teaching this theory to 
future lawyers, therefore, offers the tantalizing possibility of improv-
ing lawyering and, consequently, our justice system.
27
 
 
However, as Luban goes on to write about in the second half of 
his book, moral activism as simply a theory for one-to-one representa-
                                                          
27
 Luban has a wonderful quote from Abraham Lincoln that he provides as an 
example of his conclusion in defense of the theory of moral activism that “nothing 
permits a lawyer to discard her discretion or relieves her of the necessity of asking 
whether a client’s project is worthy of a decent person’s service.” See LUBAN, supra 
note 9, at 174. Lincoln is quoted as having said to a client: 
Yes, we can doubtless gain your case for you; we can set 
a whole neighborhood at loggerheads; we can distress a 
widowed mother and her six fatherless children and 
thereby get you six hundred dollars to which you seem to 
have a legal claim, but which rightfully belongs, it ap-
pears to me, as much to the woman and her children as it 
does to you. You must remember that some things legally 
right are not morally right. We shall not take your case, 
but will give you a little advice for which we will charge 
you nothing. You seem to be a sprightly, energetic man; 
we would advise you to try your hand at making six hun-
dred dollars in some other way. 
Id. As Luban notes, “Lincoln freed the slaves; this may not be unconnected to 
the fact that in his practice of law he was himself no slave, not even to trade idioms 
that he surely thought were moral idioms as well.” Id.  
While this example is, to be sure, inspiring, it is also more difficult than it 
appears to emulate. It is rare that moral dilemmas that give rise to this sort of ethical 
dilemma are easy to address. In fact, as is true with any talented person who does 
something well, it is likely that even Lincoln did not behave this way easily despite 
our perceptions of how easy, graceful, and eminently obvious his words may appear 
to us now. Imagine, therefore, having the opportunity to try to teach all lawyers how 
to apply this level of integrity to their daily practice within the context of live client 
dilemmas, as diverse and as numerous as those encountered in a six or nine-semester 
rotation! 
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tion is not sufficient.
28
 Moral activism is also a theory that permits 
lawyers to more clearly connect their training and professional en-
deavors to larger issues of justice. It is akin, suggests Luban, to Justice 
Brandeis’s conception of the “opportunity in the law.”29 Brandeis saw 
that law provided an opportunity to balance and neutralize powerful 
private interests, which was a necessity for democracy. The morally 
activist lawyer, concerned as she is about the common morality that 
underlies democratic principles is committed, as was Brandeis, to the 
necessity of the “people’s lawyer.” The “people’s lawyer” is the law-
yer that provides this balance.
30
 
 
 In this respect, moral activism offers a theory that supports 
lawyer responsibility for addressing the access to justice issue. Here, I 
am not suggesting that morally activist lawyers will all become “peo-
ple’s lawyers.” Rather, I am suggesting that the responsibility for en-
suring the political will (and the financial support that is a necessary 
corollary) for addressing the access to justice issue is the responsibility 
of all lawyers. 
 
There is support for this proposition in the American Bar Asso-
ciation (“ABA”) Model Rules, which speak of lawyers “having special 
responsibility for the quality of justice.”31 What, precisely, does re-
sponsibility for the “quality of justice” mean? Presumably, it incorpo-
rates notions of fundamental fairness—for the quality of justice that is 
unfair would seem to be quite obviously poor—but that begs the ques-
tion, what is fair? Arguably, what is fair is a process or procedure that 
treats all users of that process or procedure equally. This does not 
mean that all users are, in fact, equal. They may not be equal to one 
another in talents, looks, industriousness, or many other measures. 
However, our definition of fair government makes clear that they are 
each treated as equals before the law, regardless of their differences.
32
 
 
                                                          
28
 See LUBAN, supra note 9, at 237–39. 
29
 Id. at xxiii. 
30
 Id. at 171–72. Luban credits Brandeis’s discussion of the “people’s lawyer” 
as being very close to the “progressive correction of classical liberalism—the private 
sector in an industrial democracy raises political threats comparable to those that 
democratic government faced in its confrontations with the various anciens ré-
gimes.” Id.  
31
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble & Scope (2012). 
32
 LUBAN, supra note 9, at 253. 
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Luban analyzes the United States Supreme Court building’s 
famous promise of “Equal Justice Under Law” in order to determine 
whether it is actually a right.
33
 He asks the question, is equal justice 
under law “part of our structure of political legitimacy?”34 Citing sev-
eral historical examples, including the right of women to sue in court 
before they had the right to vote, the Civil War amendments that made 
African Americans citizens and “allowed them access to American 
courts,” and Supreme Court decisions that allowed non-citizens access 
to American courts, Luban argues that “equality-of-rights-not-fortunes 
has always been a common denominator of American political life.”35  
 
The question then becomes whether equality of rights implies 
equality of legal rights. As Luban explains, early American writers 
were most likely thinking about moral rights, “or (more likely) rights 
given by God in natural law.”36 Therefore, in order to read equality of 
legal rights as implicit in the concept of equality of rights, it is neces-
sary to view legal rights as connected to moral rights. As Luban states, 
“. . . [I]f the court system claimed that its activities have nothing much 
to do with respecting moral rights we would view it as seriously defec-
tive.”37  
 
However, he goes on to state that the right to legal services is 
not a moral one, but rather, a political one.
38
 In this respect, it is not 
similar to claiming rights to food, shelter, clothing or other kinds of 
“welfare rights;” instead, it “derives implicitly from the nature of polit-
ical legitimacy.”39 Additionally, the derivation is relative to our partic-
ular system of government, so, again, unlike welfare rights that are 
more closely tied to a moral conception of human dignity, equality of 
legal rights only exists as a legitimation principle of our particular so-
ciety:  
 
Legitimation rights are claims to goods that 
form presuppositions of a people’s common po-
litical life; when these rights are denied, the ex-
pectation that the affronted parties should con-
                                                          
33
 See id. at 252–53. 
34
 Id. at 252. 
35
 Id. at 253. 
36
 Id. at 254. 
37
 Id. 
38
 LUBAN, supra note 9, at 265. 
39
 Id. 
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tinue to respect the political system—in other 
words, the expectation that they should continue 
to treat it as a legitimate political system—has 
no basis.
40
  
 
Thus, “absent equal access to the legal system . . . our system 
violates the principle of consistency and its own legitimation princi-
ples.”41 Quoting Locke, Luban concludes his argument in support of 
his contention that access to legal services for all is necessary to our 
democracy.
42
 Without it, there is in an implied right to resist, which 
can and should lead to revolution and war: “. . . [A]n illegitimate sys-
tem generates a right of resistance: for resistance is the ultimate sanc-
tion when a political system undermines the premises of its own claim 
to govern a common life.” 43 
 
Underscoring Luban’s point is his response to Pepper’s argu-
ment about first-class citizenship. As Luban points out, Pepper’s con-
ception of the amoral lawyer as a facilitator of first-class citizenship is 
a comparative one: 
 
[T]he components of first-class citizenship al-
low you to leverage yourself into a better posi-
tion (economic or otherwise) than those who 
don’t have them. The resulting competitive ad-
vantage in turn give[s] you further leverage to 
augment your position still more . . . . Finally, 
your augmented position will get you the influ-
ence and power to push for rule changes that 
further enhance the packet of perks accruing to 
first-class citizens. 
 
In this way, the differential granting of first-
class citizens yields a self-producing vicious 
spiral of social inequality and outright damage 
to those who don’t have it. The problem is that 
when first-class citizenship is not universally 
                                                          
40
 Id. at 266. 
41
 Id. at 255. 
42
 Id. 
43
 Id. at 266. 
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available, its components are not mere benefits; 
they are advantages.
44
 
 
It is therefore incumbent on the lawyer, as facilitator of this vi-
cious cycle of power and damage infliction, to prevent this. The pre-
vention does not occur by refusing to represent a corporation or even 
by imposition of lawyers’ own moral values, but rather by ensuring a 
necessary balance and moral restraint through legal services access for 
all. Stated another way, access to justice, or lack of access, changes the 
very nature of what access confers on the represented. In a system 
where all have equal rights of access, the role of lawyers could be con-
ceived as facilitators of citizenship benefits for all. Where, however, 
access to justice is unequal, the role of lawyers becomes facilitators of 
first-class citizenship for those with access, and, by implication, pur-
veyors of second-class citizenship to those without. Simply by the act 
of representing parties in a system where others cannot obtain this rep-
resentation, lawyers become complicit in the systematic and ongoing 
disadvantaging of those who are unable to obtain representation.  
 
Further, as Luban points out, lawyers cannot disclaim respon-
sibility for these unfortunate consequences of unequal access by as-
serting that legal services access is simply a fault of the economic sys-
tem and not of the legal system.
45
 This argument is based on the 
premise “that the state has not blocked poor people from having mean-
ingful access to the legal system.”46 This premise is false because ex-
amples of governmental “blockages” of poor people from the legal 
system are numerous: 1) the complexity of regulation that necessitates 
legal intervention; 2) the fee structures regulated by the ABA Code 
and the Model Rules and enforced by the highest court in each state; 3) 
the court-appointed lawyer system, which is governed by state and 
federal court decisions and state and federal legislative budgetary deci-
sions; and 4) the unauthorized practice of law regulations that prevent 
anyone other than lawyers from representing indigents in most legal 
contexts are just a few examples.
47
 While it could be argued that the 
solution is to have less complicated laws and a greater ability for non-
lawyers to provide representation, these solutions themselves would 
                                                          
44
 David Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative: A Response to Stephen Pepper, 
11 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 637, 644 (1986) (emphasis in original). 
45
 LUBAN, supra note 9, at 246. 
46
 Id. 
47
 Id. 
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not solve the entire access problem and would create significant other 
problems.
48
 
   
It is clear that “the selective exclusion of the poor from the le-
gal system does not simply fail to confer an advantage on them—it ac-
tively injures them.”49 Most compellingly Luban concludes, 
 
For a legal system does more than protect peo-
ple from each other: it enormously expands our 
field of action, allowing us to do things that we 
couldn’t have done otherwise—to draft wills, 
adopt children, make contracts, limit liability. 
As people utilize these features of the system, a 
network of practices—of power and privilege—
                                                          
48
 Note, for example, the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Turner v. Rogers, which involved the appeal of a child support defendant who was 
unrepresented by counsel. 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2512 (2011). The Court was unwilling to 
remedy the lack of representation issue through the appointment of counsel. Id. 
However, it clearly recognized the danger faced by the appellant in a forum that had 
been designed to be less formal in a misguided effort to respond to the numbers of 
litigants in that forum (child support) who were unable to obtain the assistance of 
counsel. See id. The Court suggests that due process requires, at a minimum, “alter-
native procedures” in which inter alia the trial court judge informs an unrepresented 
party of the critical issue and make a specific finding regarding that issue prior to 
making a ruling. Id. at 2519–20. These “alternative procedures” seem very like, 
however, the everyday procedures in a court of law whose procedures have not been 
significantly reduced in an effort to simplify the law.  
Additionally, even where there are quite competent non-legal representa-
tives, they are not equal to qualified legal representatives who represent the opposing 
party in a typical David and Goliath matter. In my experience, foreclosure matters 
illustrate this quite well. Philadelphia, in an effort to stem the alarming rise of fore-
closures after the 2008 market crash, created an interim settlement procedure meant 
to provide unrepresented homeowners the opportunity to try to resolve their loan de-
faults with a loan modification. Federal and state funding allowed for an enormous 
expansion in the number of housing counselors—non-lawyers—who were trained 
and available to assist homeowners in default through this process. Despite the excel-
lent service they generally provided, in most cases, if there was no lawyer for the 
homeowner, no loan re-structuring occurred. When pro bono lawyers or legal ser-
vices lawyers ultimately intervened, pointing out or actually filing counterclaims to 
the foreclosure action, the re-structured loan that was originally proposed by the 
housing counselor suddenly became acceptable to the bank. When a knowledgeable 
housing counselor was able to identify and discuss these same issues with the bank, 
however, there was little responsiveness on the part of the bank because it was well 
aware that a homeowner, even with the housing counselor’s guidance, was unlikely 
to actually file any paperwork pro se. 
49
 LUBAN, supra note 9, at 247. 
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is set up from which those who have no access 
to the system are excluded; and this exclusion 
itself intensifies the pariah status of the poor. It 
is hard to avoid the conclusion that the state has 
conferred the advantages of the legal system on 
those who can afford to use it and built it on the 
backs of those who cannot. The state has not 
been an innocent bystander observing the re-
grettable spectacle of economic inequality and 
poverty: it shares primary responsibility with 
the legal profession (and its well-off clients) for 
the fact that the poor have no meaningful access 
to justice and are made worse off by that fact.
50
 
 
Thus, while even the morally activist lawyer contributes to jus-
tice in providing ethical representation to her private sector client, the 
systemic exclusion of the poor from the legal system perpetuates dis-
parities in power that undermine the legitimacy of the legal system as a 
whole. For these reasons, the morally activist lawyer, regardless of the 
identity of her clients, must also have as a central professional concern 
the plight of those who cannot afford representation.  
 
So, what does this have to do with legal education? First, if 
regularly taught and employed, Luban’s moral activism would result in 
more ethical lawyering. Second, if the pedagogy used to teach moral 
activism is experiential, and I will defend this as the best choice for 
rounding out ethical teaching below,
51
 then the effort to ensure that all 
lawyers receive experiential education can provide an opportunity for 
doing so through the provision of legal services to the indigent, signif-
icantly and positively impacting the access to justice issue. 
 
A.  Applying Morally Activist Principles: “The Fourfold Root of Suffi-
cient Reasoning” 
 
One way to explore whether teaching moral activism could ac-
tually make a difference in ensuring more effective ethical lawyering 
is to examine historical examples of lawyering where we would agree 
that there were ethical lapses and try to determine whether the em-
ployment of moral activist principles by the lawyers involved might 
                                                          
50
 Id. at 247–48. 
51
 See infra Part II. 
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have resulted in a different outcome. The Watergate and Enron scan-
dals and the recent economic crisis are three examples that come im-
mediately to mind and will be explored more fully below. 
 
Preliminarily, it must be noted that, I recognize that the follow-
ing analysis is an oversimplification of the deliberative process sug-
gested by Luban as well as an overly formulaic application of a con-
cept applied to situations that were more complex than suggested. 
Nevertheless, I believe that the analysis shows that if the theories pos-
ited by Luban were taught regularly and just as regularly discussed and 
deliberatively applied in a clinical setting to real world ethical prob-
lems, a kind of morally deliberative habit could be developed that 
could change the way lawyers operate for the better. Below, therefore, 
is Luban’s theory and my own analysis of how application of that the-
ory might have provided the lawyers involved with at least a branch to 
reach for as they floundered in the rapid and roiling currents of their 
practices. 
 
Having concluded that common morality must be considered 
even when it is in conflict with “role morality,” that is one’s own un-
derstanding of one’s professional obligations, Luban develops and ex-
plains a “structure of justification” that can also be used as a “structure 
of deliberation” to determine how to respond to the conflict: “The 
Fourfold Root of Sufficient Reasoning.”52 Essentially, lawyers facing 
such a conflict should consider the justification, as demonstrated by its 
moral goodness, of the institution requiring the specific role obliga-
tion—the adversary system.
53
 Next, lawyers should consider the justi-
fication of the role as demonstrated by the institution.
54
 Third, lawyers 
should consider the justification for the role obligation by demonstrat-
ing its essentialness to the role.
55
 Finally, lawyers should consider the 
role act being contemplated by demonstrating that the role obligations 
require that act.
56
  
 
In an effort to create a more deliberative structure that incorpo-
rates this reasoning, Luban suggests the following seven-step process: 
 
                                                          
52
 LUBAN, supra note 9, at 105, 140–41. 
53
 Id. at 128–32. 
54
 Id. 
55
 Id. 
56
 Id. 
Miller-Wilson 7/11/2013  4:11 PM 
2013] HARMONIZING CURRENT THREATS 67 
1) Identify “the institution, the role, the role ob-
ligation and the role act.” 
2) Assess “the institution, role and role obliga-
tion in the light of the ends they are to serve.” 
3) Apply “the minimum-threshold test: deter-
mining whether, at each link” (in The Fourfold 
Root of Sufficient Reasoning), “the credits and 
debits indicate that the entity (institution, role, 
role obligation, role act) is justified;” 
4) Apply “the cumulative-weight test: determin-
ing the total significance of the various policy 
arguments to the role act;” 
5) Assess “the relevance of the policy argu-
ments to the case at hand;” 
6) Resolve “the dilemma by weighing the justi-
fication of the role act against the moral offense 
of performing it;” 
7) Act.
57
 
 
So, we turn first to our example of the ethical lapses of the Wa-
tergate lawyers. What could we predict the outcome might have been 
if they had engaged in this exercise? In step one, of course, the institu-
tion is the adversary system, the role is advocate, the role obligation is 
zeal or loyalty, and the act their client, the White House, requested was 
orchestrating an illegal break-in of their opposing party’s headquarters 
in order to find information that could be used against their adver-
sary.
58
  
 
The assessment in step two does not speak of the role act, 
merely of the preceding three entities. We already know, from both the 
standard conception of lawyer roles and the morally activist concep-
                                                          
57
 Id. at 140. Note that Luban himself admits that this lengthy deliberative pro-
cess might seem too much to ask. LUBAN, supra note 9, at 140. Further, he explicitly 
states that it is a “theoretical account of moral justification, not a recipe for real-time 
deliberation.” Id. Nevertheless, he goes on to state that it is still a valuable tool for an 
analysis of the rules of professional obligation. Id. This is how I apply it to the spe-
cific examples and, in so doing, hope to show how teaching this theory can be ap-
plied to live client dilemmas in order to teach the habit of ethical dilemma identifica-
tion and problem-solving. Ultimately, as I will argue, it is teaching this habit that is 
paramount to shoring up lawyer ethical behavior. 
58
 Mark Curriden, The Lawyers of Watergate, 98 A.B.A. J., June 2012, at 36, 
38–40. 
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tion, that the three entities: the adversary system, the role of advocate, 
and the duty of zeal are justified. In step three, however, we encounter 
a problem. As we apply the minimum threshold test to each entity, we 
see that the final entity—the role act requested by the client—is not 
minimally justified. It is not even necessary to continue with the sev-
en-step process of deliberation. Had the Watergate lawyers used this 
deliberative process, or something similar, they might have seen that 
their role obligations, as justified by their roles and the institution it-
self, were not sufficiently strong to overcome the lack of justification 
for the role act their client requested. 
 
While the very fact that the role act requested was illegal may 
seem to render an ethical deliberative process about it absurd, listening 
to the reflections of two of the lawyers at the heart of the scandal is 
very telling. Attorney Egil Krogh, Jr., Deputy Assistant to President 
Nixon at the time of the Watergate scandal commented,  
 
In law school, I took this curious course on eth-
ics . . . . But there was nothing about conflicts 
or the role of lawyers. We were in completely 
unknown territory. I was completely unpre-
pared. My loyalty to Richard Nixon was per-
sonal and total. And I had extraordinary loyalty 
to [assistant to the president for domestic affairs 
and formerly licensed attorney] John 
Erlichman.
59
  
 
Former White House Council John Dean, in reflecting on the 
Watergate scandal and his involvement stated, “If Bud and I had been 
able to sit down with each other back then at the White House, and we 
had been able to share our concerns, everything might have turned out 
differently.”
 60
  
 
These comments beg the question, what prevented them from 
sitting down and sharing their concerns? In hindsight, the reality is not 
that they were unaware that the requested act was wrong. It was that 
their interpretation of their role duties of loyalty and zealous advocacy 
obscured the conflict between their professional role (as they saw it) 
and their personal role as a good citizen. Their habit was to resolve all 
                                                          
59
 Id. at 40. 
60
 Id. at 64. 
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conflicts and potential conflicts in favor of the client, which ultimately 
led them to be blind to any conflicts. Teaching Luban’s Fourfold Root 
of Sufficient Reasoning and applying it repeatedly over the course of 
several rotations can help lawyers identify dilemmas regularly and aid 
in their ability to solve them. 
 
Perhaps it can fairly be argued that Watergate is a poor exam-
ple of an obvious ethical failure since the role act requested by the cli-
ent was not merely immoral but also illegal. We turn, then, to the 
scandal of the late 1990s involving Enron. Here, the lawyers’ actions 
were much more complex. The role acts requested by the corporate 
client were, essentially, to keep confidential any accounting irregulari-
ties so that shareholders and government regulators were misled about 
Enron’s assets and liabilities.61 Embedded in this request was also a 
request to certify as legal, and therefore permissible, various “loans” 
that were reported as “sales.”62 
 
However, at the time that the liability information was being 
withheld and the manager-created “sales” were being reported, it was 
not entirely clear that doing so was immoral, illegal, and ultimately de-
structive of the client. There were many factors that contributed to this 
confusion.  
 
First, Enron had followed the pattern of many corporations in 
phasing out the traditional manner of using one law firm or set of in-
house lawyers to provide legal counseling and representation. Instead, 
they parceled out their work, spreading it amongst several law firms so 
that each individual law firm only had part of the picture about En-
ron’s activities, proposals, and financial status.63 
                                                          
61
 See Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counse-
lor After Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1185–87 (2003). 
62
 See id. at 1185–86.  This summary of events is clearly a gross oversimplifi-
cation of what occurred. However, irrespective of the more complex details, applica-
tion of Luban’s moral theory to it is still meaningful to the question of how things 
could have come out differently had the lawyers involved been provided with a great 
deal more ethical training. 
63
 In his article, “A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor after 
Enron,” Robert Gordon examines this particular phenomenon in great detail.  See 
generally id. As he describes it,  
Big companies used to have a single outside law firm on 
which they would rely for most of their legal advice. . . . 
At its best . . . the system allowed lawyers to learn the 
business they were advising and, since they were not 
Miller-Wilson 7/11/2013  4:11 PM 
70 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL 13:1 
Second, many managers discouraged the lawyers with whom 
they were consulting to investigate beyond the confines of the infor-
mation provided them.
64
 Presumably they did so in a manner that 
seemed at the time to be a little constraining but not directly obstruc-
tionist as it later turned out to be. The lawyers therefore were misled 
into believing that the information that was kept from them wasn’t all 
that relevant to their decision-making and therefore, upon meeting re-
sistance from the managers, they didn’t probe.65 
Third, the lawyers ultimately became confused as to who their 
client was. They relied too heavily on the assumption that high-level 
managers with whom they interacted had the best interests of their 
corporate client at heart, or, assuming that such managers were actual-
ly their clients, didn’t question manager behavior.66 Had they been 
more objective, the managers’ behavior might have raised flags that 
would have prompted further probing.
67
  
 
                                                                                                                                         
easily replaced, to give independent and critical advice. . . 
. [I]n recent years . . . [t]here [has been] no entity inside 
or outside the organization with the overall knowledge 
and prestige to give independent advice.  
Id. at 1202 (internal citations omitted).  
This phenomenon, specifically as it applies to what happened with the En-
ron crisis, lends plausibility to the lawyers’ claim that they didn’t really know or un-
derstand the Enron managers’ proposals sufficiently to be able to give valid counsel. 
As Gordon writes, “. . . Enron never trusted any one set of lawyers with extensive 
information about its operations—it spread legal work out to over 100 law firms. . . . 
It is this layering of authority, fragmentation of responsibility, and decentralization 
that has made it possible for the chairman, CEO and board of directors of Enron, as 
well as the lawyers, to claim that they did not know much about what was going on 
in their own company.” Id. at 1193–94.  
Neal Batson, the court-appointed examiner of the Enron bankruptcy notes in 
his Final Report that “Enron employed over 250 in-house attorneys and retained 
hundreds of law firms.” Final Report of Neal Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner at 
48, In re Enron Corp., (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2003) (No. 01-16034) [hereinafter 
“Batson Report”]. 
64
 Gordon, supra note 61, at 1203. 
65
 There is some controversy about whether the misleading was intentional or 
merely the unintended consequence of managers trying to get results quickly and ef-
ficiently. Either way, however, the message received by the lawyers was that they 
didn’t need to probe; they just needed to perform. 
66
 “One explanation for the attorneys’ failure may be that they lost sight of the 
fact that the corporation was their client. It appears that some of these attorneys con-
sidered the officers to be their clients when, in fact, the attorneys owed duties to En-
ron.” Batson Report, supra note 63, at 115. 
67
 Id. at 114–15. 
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There are more cynical explanations for the lawyers’ failures, 
of course, involving their own greed and consequent willingness to 
keep Enron’s business at almost any costs.68 Acknowledging this ar-
gument, however, fails to erase the very real role conflict issues that 
this corporate representation raised for the individual lawyers in-
volved. 
  
There are also those that would argue that there was no lawyer 
failure; instead, the Enron lawyers simply engaged in their duties of 
confidentiality and zealous representation.
69
 Some suggest the real 
culprits are the directors of Enron, who were, to varying degrees, pro-
vided with evidence that the transactions were risky and fraught with 
conflict of interest problems but failed to act.
70
 With the benefit of 
hindsight, there is little doubt that there were multiple culprits in the 
Enron debacle. Whether the lawyers are less to blame than the direc-
tors or the intentionally fraudulent Enron managers does not change 
the need, as lawyers and educators of lawyers, to analyze what oc-
curred and suggest that there was room for the lawyers to improve 
their effectiveness, at a minimum. 
 
Analyzing the role acts that the Enron lawyers were asked to 
engage in repeatedly, we can see two distinct patterns: 1) maintaining 
client confidences and 2) providing advice regarding the legality of 
various client-proposed transactions. The role conflict occurred in ad-
dressing the context of both of these fairly quotidian lawyer acts. In 
the first instance, Enron sought legal assistance in avoiding disclosure 
of certain facts that ordinarily would have been required to be provid-
ed to the Board of Directors, Enron’s shareholders, and various gov-
ernment agencies. Given that the default was to report, a lawyer asked 
to withhold information should immediately be concerned about 
whether doing so would run afoul of existing legal obligations and 
therefore trigger the deliberative process necessary to determine 
whether the requested role act is justified and therefore performable.
71
 
                                                          
68
 See Jill E. Fisch & Kenneth M. Rosen, Is There a Role for Lawyers in Pre-
venting Future Enrons?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1097, 1109–11 (2003) (detailing numer-
ous wrongdoings by Enron’s main law firm and tying their revenues to the success of 
Enron, their largest client). 
69
 See Gordon, supra note 61, at 1194 (laying out a similar defense as the 
“classic defense for the corporate lawyer’s role”).  
70
 Fisch & Rosen, supra note 68, at 1118–19. 
71
 Batson Report, supra note 63, at 28. 
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Doing so now, we can see that the role act of confidentiality 
could have been justified (along with the adversary system and the 
lawyer role) as meeting the minimum-threshold test as required by step 
                                                                                                                                         
 It should be noted here that some believe that whether it is minimally obliga-
tory to raise questions about specific client requests is, in the first instance, resolved 
by how the role is defined. So, for example, if a lawyer sees herself as an independ-
ent advisor and/or takes on the role of gatekeeper, then clearly lots of questions 
should be asked prior to approving a particular client proposal. If, however, the law-
yer sees herself simply as the client’s advocate, the lawyer’s role is to find a way to 
approve the client’s proposed schemes. Luban, Gordon, Fisch and Rosen all agree 
that the distinction between these roles changes the moral calculus. Luban and Gor-
don, however, argue that the pure advocate role is inappropriate in the civil corporate 
representation context. See LUBAN, supra note 9, at 11–18; Gordon, supra note 61, at 
1204–06. On the other hand, Fisch and Rosen argue that, while not inappropriate, it 
does cause ethical issues that could be best addressed by increasing and improving 
corporate regulation rather than lawyer regulation. See Fisch & Rosen, supra note 
68, at 1102–04, 1131. For purposes of our discussion I do not believe that the dis-
tinctions in lawyer role matter. 
A pure advocate who “merely” finds a way to do what his client wants, 
without regard to the implications of the client’s proposals is arguably as ineffective 
as the gatekeeper who fails to investigate. Enron is the perfect example of this inef-
fectiveness. The lawyers’ zealous defense of the managers’ proposals ultimately con-
tributed to their client’s collapse. The problem, then, was not the differing perspec-
tive on role but the lawyers’ failure to understand who their client was and to engage 
in the appropriate probing of facts that would have protected their client. The larger 
point, however, is that, even if the managers and not the corporation had been their 
clients, effective advocacy (not just effective advising) requires probing. An effec-
tive advocate, who, after appropriate research and investigation, discovers that a cli-
ent’s proposed scheme isn’t workable, can work with the client to determine a work-
able way to meet her client’s goals. The ineffective advocate, just like the ineffective 
advisor, exposes her client to potential liability. The question for legal educators, 
therefore, is how can we teach lawyers to probe sufficiently, regardless of their role, 
so that advice and representation are comporting with ethical and community moral 
standards at all times.  
As Professor Steven Schwarcz specifically recommends, in his analysis of 
the financial crisis of 2008, educators must take more time to ensure that lawyers are 
taught: “to be aware that client actions can cause harmful consequences that may not 
be immediately obvious,” “why market participants do not always see or appreciate 
the potential that their actions will cause harm,” and that “complexity exacerbates 
these concerns. It can undermine disclosure’s adequacy. It can also tempt individuals 
to make oversimplifications, to overrely on heuristics such as agency ratings and 
mathematical risk models.” Lawyers should also be taught, “to recognize that busi-
ness people often have higher risk tolerances, as well as different, legitimate, pres-
sures (e.g., budgets), that tend to influence their decisions.” Finally, lawyers should 
be taught “to better understand the core principles of corporate law and finance, 
thereby broadening their perspectives and enabling them to better identify and assess 
consequences.” Steven L. Schwarcz, The Role of Lawyers in the Global Financial 
Crisis, 24 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 214, 225–26 (2010) (citations omitted). 
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three. In step four, the total significance of the various policy argu-
ments weighing in favor of client confidentiality can be assessed as 
high. Further, the relevance of the policy arguments to the case at hand 
is also high, as presumably the duty of confidentiality in this case con-
tributed a great deal to Enron managers’ willingness to share their 
schemes with their lawyers to the extent that they actually did so.
72
 
However, when we move to resolving the dilemma by weighing the 
justification of the role act against the moral offense of performing it, 
we see that once again, the justification of role act fails.  
 
Enron was a multi-billion dollar corporation. It employed thou-
sands of people and shareholders had invested billions of dollars in it. 
It had outstanding contractual obligations around the world.
73
 The 
lawyers knew or should have known the policies behind the various 
disclosure and reporting requirements from which Enron was seeking 
to escape. Certainly, nothing should prevent a lawyer from investigat-
ing whether a particular regulatory requirement as applied to her client 
is somehow unfairly onerous and therefore challengeable. But, as Gor-
don states, this is a far cry from being, “free to ignore, subvert, or nul-
lify the laws because the value [the corporation] contributes to society 
justifies its obeying the higher-law imperatives of profit-seeking and 
shareholder-wealth-creation.”74 Justification for disobeying regulatory 
requirements and fiduciary duty simply because the managers sought 
to further their wealth-maximizing schemes was precisely what the 
lawyers were being asked to do. Engaging in the weighing process re-
quired by step six of the The Fourfold Root of Sufficient Reasoning 
enables the lawyer to see this fact and clarifies the stakes of the conse-
quences of the task that the Enron lawyers were asked to perform.  
 
                                                          
72
 As discussed above, Gordon revealed that in fact the managers disclosed 
very little to the professionals involved or left their lawyers’ questions unanswered. 
Gordon, supra note 61, at 1203. This, of course, undercuts the broad traditional justi-
fication for confidentiality. Arguably, therefore, simply on the grounds that the man-
agers were NOT revealing confidences but instead were discouraging the few lawyer 
attempts to get information, the lawyers should have and would have been justified 
in disclosing information or at least warning the managers that they could not pro-
vide the necessary legal counsel without further information. 
73
 See Kurt Eichenwald & Diana B. Henriques, Enron’s Many Strands: The 
Company Unravels; Enron Buffed Image to a Shine Even as it Rotted from Within, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/10/business/enron-s-
many-strands-company-unravels-enron-buffed-image-shine-even-it-
rotted.html?pagewanted=1 
74
 Gordon, supra note 61, at 1199. 
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Keeping confidences, instead of working with executives to 
disclose and correct their schemes, resulted in the loss of thousands of 
jobs, millions of dollars, ultimately the destruction of the client and, 
perhaps even more critically, faith in the justice system.
75
 If, as many 
stated in the aftermath, such corrupt and damaging behavior could be 
perpetuated and kept secret in the name of the adversary system,
76
 then 
something was very broken with that system. 
 
The second role act of the Enron lawyers was providing advice 
regarding the legality of various proposed transactions. As with confi-
dentiality, this particular role act is wholly consistent with all concep-
tions of lawyering. So, what went wrong? The trigger for the delibera-
tive test that could have, if engaged in, prevented numerous harms was 
not the request for advice itself, but rather the manner in which that re-
quest was asked to be executed.  
 
The Batson Report declares that several Enron attorneys violat-
ed their ethical obligations because they failed to adequately investi-
gate the facts underlying the proposed transactions.
77
 One of many ex-
amples illustrates the problem clearly. The law firm of Vinson & 
Elkins was reportedly Enron’s primary outside law firm.78 Enron al-
legedly sought “true sale opinions” regarding some of their transac-
tions in order to be able to list gains rather than losses on their disclo-
sure forms.
79
 According to the Batson Report, Enron sought such an 
opinion regarding a particular transaction with Sundance Industrial, 
even though the lawyers had no information that there was a “valid 
business purpose” for the “sale,” which is an essential component of a 
“true sale.”80 
  
Turning to our seven deliberative steps, then, as with the confi-
dentiality issue discussed above, we can move easily through the first 
five steps. However, at the sixth step, weighing the justification—
                                                          
75
 Julie Appleby, Many Who Lost Savings, Jobs Pleased, USA TODAY (May. 
25, 2006, 10:07 AM). 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/industries/energy/2006-05-25-enron-
workers-usat_x.htm. 
76
 See, e.g., Fisch & Rosen, supra note 68, at 1109. 
77
 See Batson Report, supra note 63, at 48–55. 
78
 Id. at 48. 
79
 See id. at 49 (stating that Vinson & Elkins delivered a true sale opinion to 
Enron while representing them). 
80
 Id. 
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willful ignorance of the zealous advocate—against the moral offense—
misleading the public regarding the strength and legality of a particular 
transaction—leads to the unmistakable conclusion that the role act is 
not justified. This is particularly true where, as here, that willful igno-
rance leads to an act that actually harms one’s client. Finally, as Gor-
don points out, the willful ignorance of the zealous advocate is not jus-
tified in the non-adversarial context of advice-giving.
81
 
 
One further note on the importance of teaching moral activism 
both theoretically and in practice is recognition of the true meaning of 
simply discussing a code of ethics, federal or state, without regard to 
moral doctrine. As Thomas Bost pointed out, in reflecting on the En-
ron collapse, “[T]he Code makes fewer moral claims . . . today than in 
the past.”82 Citing Mary Ann Glendon’s historical analysis of the 
changes in the canons of ethics adopted by the ABA, Bost notes that in 
1908 the Canon suggested that effective lawyers should “impress on 
the client . . . exact compliance with the strictest principles of moral 
law.”83 Today, however, the “ABA Model Rules, no doubt reflecting 
the current diminished ‘consensus on what is right and wrong for law-
yers,’ contain no comparable moral imperative.”84  
 
This lack of emphasis on morality, importantly, should not be 
mistaken for “value-neutral” teaching.  Citing the work of Deborah 
Rhode and Paul Paton, Bost points out that extracting morality from 
                                                          
81
 Gordon, supra note 61, at 1205 (“The advocacy ideology regularly and per-
sistently confuses the managers, who ask for lawyers’ advice, with the lawyers’ ac-
tual client, the corporate entity.”). 
 After a detailed analysis of the distinction between the criminal defense law-
yer’s role and the corporate attorney’s role, Gordon concludes that there is actually a 
common factor between the two and that is that both roles involve a public aspect.  
Id. at 1204–07. “The real lesson from the defense lawyer’s or advocate’s role is 
simply that the lawyer is, in addition to being a private agent of his clients, a public 
agent of the legal system, whose job is to help clients steer their way through the 
maze of the law, to bring clients’ conduct and behavior into conformity with the 
law—to get the client as much as possible of what the client wants without damaging 
the framework of the law. He may not act in furtherance of his client’s interest in 
ways that ultimately frustrate, sabotage, or nullify the public purposes of the laws.” 
Id. at 1207. 
82
 Thomas G. Bost, The Lawyer as Truth-Teller: Lessons from Enron, 32 PEPP. 
L. REV. 505, 514–15 (2005). 
83
 Id. at 515 (emphasis added by Bost) (citing MARY ANN GLENDON, A 
NATION UNDER LAWYERS 80 (1994) (quoting CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Cannon 32 
(1908))). 
84
 Id. (quoting GLENDON, supra note 83, at 79). 
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the curriculum sends an “unmistakable message” that “conformity to 
the Code” is what is expected—and nothing more.85 While Bost ulti-
mately falls short of advocating for broad-based moral teaching, he 
concludes his article with a call to Christian lawyers to understand 
how their religious teachings should inform their own kind of morally 
activist approach.
86
 
  
While I recognize, as Bost does, that it is quite challenging to 
reach consensus on moral and ethical values, I reject the notion that 
this failure of consensus should permit the elimination of explicit dis-
cussions of moral values unless the discussion is amongst a closed 
group with presumed shared moral values. In fact, it is precisely be-
cause of the diversity of moral and ethical viewpoints that exist in a 
pluralistic society such as ours, that values-based discussions, allowing 
for diverse viewpoints, should become a mainstay of legal ethics 
teachings. Further, as I argue, there is no better way to ensure that 
there are myriad opportunities to see this diversity of moral and ethical 
viewpoints and struggle with how to act consistently as both a moral 
being—however that is defined—and a lawyer than in the course of the 
representation of multiple, culturally and economically diverse clients 
in a variety of different substantive contexts. Beyond the details of 
lawyer role in the Enron collapse, and how an application of the delib-
erative process developed by Luban might have created a different and 
better result, a broader lesson from Enron is how the failure to include 
discussions of morality and values in the teaching of ethics makes it 
much less likely that lawyers facing a complex ethical problem will be 
able to appropriately identify and analyze their ethical obligations.  
Finally, we move to the financial crisis of 2008. Here, there 
were many phenomena that contributed to the event.
87
 The involve-
ment of lawyers related to their role in designing and approving new 
financial instruments and disclosing (or not disclosing) information re-
lated to those instruments that sellers and buyers relied on to make 
their decisions. There is debate about whether lawyers bear any re-
sponsibility at all for what occurred.
88
 Many maintain that the new fi-
                                                          
85
 Id. at 515 (quoting Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. Paton, Lawyers, Ethics and 
Enron, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 9, 37 (2002)). 
86
 Id. at 518. 
87
 See generally Sewell Chan, Financial Crisis was Avoidable, Inquiry Finds, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2011, at A1. 
88
 Compare Claire A. Hill, Who Were the Villains in the Subprime Crisis, and 
Why it Matters, 4 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 323,  344 (2010) (“In any event, law-
yers were not themselves involved in anything they knew or had reason to suppose 
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nancial instruments that were created are still a good idea and an ex-
ample of an innovative and exciting way to develop new financial 
products.
89
 These same scholars opine that the problem lay not with 
the products themselves or with the lawyers but with the perverse in-
centives that they created and which were unchecked by regulation.
90
 
 
Even assuming this contention is true, there remains consensus 
that if there were stronger, more effective legal advisors, some of the 
consequences could have been forecast and minimized if not avoided 
altogether.
91
 Without getting too mired in the details of the financial 
transactions and the lawyers involved, what is relevant for our purpos-
es is determining whether an analysis of the myriad role acts that were 
requested, using Luban’s theory, could have been helpful. 
 
One small part of the beginnings of the crisis was the develop-
ment of a vehicle that pooled subprime loans with other prime loans.
92
 
It seemed like an ingenious creation, allowing low-income borrowers 
to purchase homes and lenders to reduce or eliminate their risk while 
further allowing a chain of investors to earn profits. In a strong real es-
tate market, it is easy to see why this appeared to be a win-win. As de-
faults on the subprime loans increased, however, there should have 
been a re-thinking of the vehicle. Instead, market players not wanting 
to look back, simply increased the numbers of subprime loans.
93
  
                                                                                                                                         
was fraudulent or even deeply flawed.”), with Donald C. Langevoort, Getting (Too) 
Comfortable: In-House Lawyers, Enterprise Risk, and the Financial Crisis, 2012 
WIS. L. REV. 495, 517 (2012) (“To date, we lack the ‘smoking gun’ evidence of ex-
tensive lawyer complicity with client fraud in the aftermath of the financial crisis . . . 
.[;] [s]till, I suspect that some lawyers were close enough to those events that they 
could have functioned as gatekeeper if willing and able.”). 
89
 See Hill, supra note 88, at 324. 
90
 See, e.g., id.at 348–49 (suggesting “better monitoring of ‘systematic risk’” 
and “adjustments of compensation structures of investment bankers” as possible so-
lutions); Shaun Barnes, Kathleen G. Cully & Steven L. Schwarcz, In-House Coun-
sel’s Role in the Structuring of Mortgage-Backed Securities, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 521, 
531–32 (2012) (“[C]ompensation structures that reward accomplishing short-term 
goals like the successful negotiation of a deal or the execution of an asset transfer, 
can be perverse incentives for managers.”); Brian E. Berger, The Professional Re-
sponsibility of Lawyers and the Financial Crisis, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 3, 11 
(2011) (“[E]fforts aimed at reducing harm should focus not on lawyer conduct but on 
whether to legally prohibit or otherwise limit potentially harmful transactions.”). 
91
 See generally Langevoort, supra note 88; Schwarcz, supra note 71; Berger, 
supra note 90. 
92
 Hill, supra note 88, at 329–30. 
93
 See id. at 341. 
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Originators realized that since they sold the loans almost im-
mediately, whatever problems might arise with bad loans would not 
face them. They reasoned that they bore no responsibility beyond fol-
lowing legal disclosure requirements for ensuring that what the buyers 
purchased was viable. Thus, satisfying themselves that they were do-
ing nothing wrong, the number of subprime deals that were created, 
packaged, and sold increased precipitously with little to no regard 
about the quality of the loans being packaged.
94
 The development was, 
of course, gradual, and therefore easier in hindsight to pinpoint then it 
was as it was occurring. Nevertheless, it should have become clear at 
some point to the lawyers that the deals were moving too quickly for a 
“full and thorough review.”95 As Claire Hill notes, the lawyers “proba-
bly did notice . . . that the loans they were helping to securitize were 
being made to borrowers of steadily declining quality . . . . But they al-
so knew that the transaction structure was designed precisely to carve 
out some high-quality interests from pools of low-quality mortgag-
es.”96  
 
Professor Donald Langevoort puts perspective on this kind of 
detail that lends plausibility and sympathy to the lawyers’ involve-
ment. As he explains, among the several possible explanations for “in-
termediary behavior,” “[T]here was a systematic under-appreciation of 
the risk on both the sell and buy sides.”97 How this under-appreciation 
occurred can be traced to the gradual eroding of “professional inde-
pendence” through market changes that included, as Gordon and Bat-
son noted with respect to the Enron scandal, a diffusion of legal work 
across multiple lawyers, a financial incentive system that rewarded 
lawyer deal-making rather than lawyer-provided advice and restraint, 
and the development of complex financial instruments and transactions 
that were beyond legal training.
98
 These conditions created a “cogni-
tive co-dependency” that has resulted in lawyer habits of blessing cor-
porate proposals rather than scrutinizing them critically.
99
 
 
Thus, with the financial crisis of 2008, it is difficult to pinpoint 
individual lawyer ethical lapses. What emerges is a picture of collec-
tive corporate representation that fostered support for facilitating more 
                                                          
94
 Id. 
95
 Id. 
96
 Id. 
97
 Langevoort, supra note 88, at 498. 
98
 Id. at 498–99. 
99
 Id. 
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business—at any cost—rather than restraint on business practices that 
would sufficiently account for ethical implications. The issue, then, is 
not how to prevent one particular lawyer act but rather how to develop 
and sustain the cognitive independence necessary to provide ethical 
lawyering support.
100
  
 
At various points during the years leading up to the melt-down, 
lawyers were asked to provide advice regarding the legality of finan-
cial products that would cost the corporations less and earn them more, 
to sanction contract enforcement procedures that were more efficient 
regardless of whether such procedures comported with evidentiary re-
quirements, and to not involve themselves in internal matters despite 
receiving multiple reports regarding the corporation’s own ethical 
handling of those matters. Each of these actions or inactions provided 
opportunities for the lawyers to deliberate in the fashion suggested by 
Luban. Had they done so, the justification of role could not have been 
outweighed by the moral obligation to speak up when dire conse-
quences of conduct could be predicted and, if necessary, abandon the 
role or the role act when continuing was not morally justified. Law-
yers’ role of providing advice regarding the legality of a particular 
product or transaction requires in depth investigation of the facts and 
law surrounding the creation of the product and the transaction. Such 
an investigation takes time and, had it been done, could have slowed 
down some of the poorest transactions that lead to the crash. Abandon-
ing their role act of investigation because, as zealous advocates, they 
were required to provide “advice” to their clients quickly, was not jus-
tified. 
 
Critics of this assessment will point out that this argument is 
somewhat circular since most scholars agree that a large factor in the 
                                                          
100
 This, of course, rests on the assumption that cognitive independence is ac-
tually important to ethical corporate representation. In the context of the Enron col-
lapse, we have briefly touched on the differing views of lawyer role for a corpora-
tion: the gatekeeper vs. the advocate. As with the depth of investigative functions, it 
is my contention that cognitive independence is necessary regardless of how the cor-
porate lawyer defines her role. It is only by continually maintaining objectivity that a 
person can identify and attempt to resolve potential problems with corporate pro-
posals and behavior. And this is not to suggest, as others have, that this means that a 
lawyer starts to tell the corporation how to make business decisions. The suggestion 
is merely, as stated by Steven Schwarcz, that a lawyer should undertake to under-
stand the business and legal ramifications of the decisions being proposed so that the 
legal and societal ramifications can be discussed with her client. Schwarcz, supra 
note 71, at 225–26. 
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failure of lawyer intermediaries was the overwhelming volume and 
speed of client demands that prevented any possibility of the thorough 
investigation that we now believe could have mitigated some of the 
damage.
101
 Additionally, as stated prior to beginning this analysis, the 
above is an oversimplification of the deliberative process suggested by 
Luban as well as an overly formulaic application of a concept applied 
to situations that were more complex than the analysis suggests. These 
are fair criticisms and should not be ignored.  
 
Again, however, the analysis suggests not a magic formula to 
avert world crises. Rather, it provides support for the possibility of de-
veloping a kind of morally deliberative habit. Certainly, the possibility 
of such a lawyer transformation is much more likely if the theoretical 
underpinnings were part of assigned readings and discussions for not 
just two or three cases, but ten or twenty.  
 
My larger point is that all lawyers, prior to becoming licensed 
to practice, must go through an education that is so thorough with re-
spect to ethics theory and practice that it forms a habit of ethical issue 
identification and resolution. This level of ethics education is currently 
missing. Therefore, while arguably corporate client demand would not 
be different in a post-teaching law firm world, presumably, the 
strength of lawyer habit, when shared by all lawyers available and en-
gaged in corporate representation, could more successfully have with-
stood the demand and pushed back, insisting on time and resources to 
investigate properly. 
 
B.  The Connection between Teaching Morally Activist Lawyering and 
Addressing the Access to Justice Issue 
  
I have argued that moral activism can do much for assisting the 
lawyer in resolving conflicts between role obligations and common 
morality. It is useful as an ethical tool for practitioners and could have 
substantially reduced the harmful role of the lawyers involved in three 
large historical events with wide-reaching, disastrous implications. 
Given this fact, shouldn’t we find a way to teach future lawyers about 
this theory and how to apply it?  
                                                          
101
See Sarah Kellogg, Financial Crisis 2008: Where Were the Lawyers?, 
DCBAR (Jan. 2010), http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/resources/publications/ 
washington_lawyer/january_2010/financial_crisis.cfm (discussing competitiveness 
and boom mentality as contributing to the financial crisis). 
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I suggest that creating a teaching law firm that serves the goal 
of meeting access to justice needs will do exactly this. It will provide a 
context in which every-day ethical dilemmas involving role conflict 
will arise and be grappled with by new lawyers in a supervised setting 
that provides time and space to explore the appropriate ethical re-
sponses to these dilemmas. This is not to suggest that as part of the 
more traditional law school curriculum, podium courses offering read-
ings and discussions about ethics and jurisprudence are ineffective or 
should be eliminated. What Luban and the application of Luban’s  the-
ories in the contexts described above teaches, however, is that the 
complexity of learning habits of ethical reasoning demand more than a 
one semester podium course. Experiential learning theories, discussed 
more fully in Part II provide us with support for the notion that tradi-
tional ethics courses must be supplemented by “ethics-in-action” learn-
ing opportunities.  
 
While these opportunities may be provided in a traditional clin-
ic setting, the limitations of current law school clinics militate against 
relying on this venue as the sole source of teaching ethics in the way I 
have described. Many, if not most, law schools do not have sufficient 
space to ensure that every law student can take a clinic before gradua-
tion. Clinics, moreover, are generally only one semester long, during 
which time a student will represent at most three clients. Finally, clini-
cal students generally participate on a part-time basis, so that they 
must divide their time between their clinical education and their other 
law school obligations. Given both the discussion about the absence of 
ethical deliberative habit, and its consequences, above, and the com-
parison to medical schools, which require post-medical school resi-
dency programs despite two years of clinical rotations during medical 
school, it is clear that clinical education as it is currently conceived is 
insufficient. Additionally, regarding the access to justice issue, the 
clinics themselves, although contributing a great deal towards provid-
ing representation to those who cannot afford it are, in the bigger pic-
ture, much too small in their impact given the level of need. 
 
At least one law professor, who also has her Masters in Public 
Health, speaks of one of the medical model’s “primary advantages . . . 
over law schools” as “the luxury of time.”102 As she examines the ben-
                                                          
102
 Jennifer S. Bard, “Practicing Medicine and Studying Law”: How Medical 
Schools Used to Have the Same Problems We Do and What We can Learn from 
Their Efforts to Solve Them, 10 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 135, 155 (2011). 
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efits of the medical school model, Jennifer Bard stops short of advo-
cating its large-scale adoption because she does not challenge the cur-
rent time-limited three-year law school education. By pointing to the 
variety of sources of government funding for medical education that 
do not currently exist for legal education,
 103
 Bard essentially echoes 
critiques that a restructured legal education would prove too expensive 
and not truly analogous. While I address both of these concerns lat-
er,
104
 I raise her particular articulation of them here as an admission 
that the barriers to the creation of a teaching law firm modeled after a 
teaching hospital are not at all theoretical. In other words, that law 
schools, as they currently operate, do not have the time or the money 
to create a post-graduate law residency program does not mean that 
law schools are sufficiently meeting the goal of teaching effective 
lawyer thought processes, practices, and skills. 
 
Whether barriers to adding more experiential offerings to the 
law school curriculum (during or post-law school) are cost or pedagog-
ically-related is a long standing debate within the legal community. 
The 1992 MacCrate Report, issued by the ABA but heavily influenced 
by clinical professors, focused primarily on the gap between legal edu-
cation, as it then stood, and the legal profession.
105
 Specifically, the 
report developed a “Statement of Fundamental Lawyering Skills and 
Fundamental Values,”106 which are “central to the role and functioning 
of lawyers in practice.”107 It then analyzed ways in which these skills 
and values were being taught and made recommendations for, among 
other things, curricular expansion of these teaching methods.
108
 A flur-
ry of critical publications—some decrying the costs of implementation 
of its recommendations and others denying that legal education was in 
need, pedagogically, of such major transformations as those recom-
mended—followed in its wake.109 
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 See id. at 154. 
104
 See infra Part III. 
105
 See generally A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, 
LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT–AN EDUCATIONAL 
CONTINUUM, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: 
NARROWING THE GAP (1992) [hereinafter “MACCRATE REPORT”]. 
106
 Id. at 121–221.  
107
 Russell Engler, The MacCrate Report Turns 10: Assessing its Impact and 
Identifying Gaps We Should Seek to Narrow, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 109, 113 (2001). 
108
 MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 105, at 32 –38.   
109
 Id. at 117–18. 
Miller-Wilson 7/11/2013  4:11 PM 
2013] HARMONIZING CURRENT THREATS 83 
Citing to a 2011 White Paper by the National Health Policy Fo-
rum, Bard states,  
 
“Agreement is longstanding in the medical pro-
fession that undergraduate medical education is 
insufficient to prepare freshly minted MDs for 
hands-on independent medical practice.” The 
current system of extended postgraduate, hospi-
tal-based training, commonly referred to as 
“residency” but called Graduate Medical Edu-
cation (GME) within the world of US-based 
medical training, was developed based on this 
common understanding.
110
  
 
What is made clear by this discussion is that law school clinical 
programs, while necessary, are insufficient. Further, law school reli-
ance on clinical programs, which are often limited in size and scope, is 
motivated more by cost concerns than evidence that they are sufficient 
and most pedagogically appropriate for lawyers. 
 
The importance of the resolution of this debate, and the reason 
I raise it here, is critical to the future of legal education. If, as I am 
proposing, the real barrier to the creation of a teaching law firm (or at 
a minimum a transformative expansion of current clinical offerings) is 
cost, application of moral activism theory requires lawyer and societal 
commitment to fund this endeavor. Arguments that what we have cur-
rently is pedagogically sufficient can be put to rest. At this point, twen-
ty years after issuance of the MacCrate Report, it is no longer defensi-
ble to claim that barriers to expansion of skills and values teaching are 
pedagogical. There is now an abundance of scholarly work, both in 
and out of the legal profession, that document the success of clinical 
pedagogy, which are analyzed in Part II below.   
 
Moral activism allows us to see that both the effective ethical 
training of lawyers and the democratic imperative of trying to resolve 
or substantially reduce the access to justice issue should outweigh con-
cerns of cost. Taking a morally activist stance regarding these issues, 
of course, doesn’t eliminate the cost concerns, and so I address the 
question of how to fund these firms in Part III. However, it is im-
portant to understand how viewing lawyering from a morally activist 
                                                          
110
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perspective both motivates and requires lawyers to seek public support 
for substantially increased experiential opportunities despite their 
costs. 
  
Creating a post-graduate, large-scale teaching law firm that 
employs all law school graduates who wish to become licensed attor-
neys will have a much greater impact on the access to justice problem 
as well as a much better chance of truly providing an effective skills 
and ethical education. It will engage all new lawyers in fulfilling their 
democratic obligations to ensure access to justice for all and respond 
to the justified pedagogical criticisms of law schools by creating that 
necessary but currently missing bridge to effective practice. 
 
The teaching law firm that I am proposing is a post-graduate 
mechanism that provides an opportunity for new law school graduates 
to represent live clients and within that context learn how to challenge 
the principles of partisanship and accountability of the standard con-
ception. My proposed curriculum provides an opportunity for learning 
how to effectively represent clients from a morally activist viewpoint 
as well as from a traditionally legal realist view.
111
 It provides new 
lawyers the opportunity to practice law in an “exacting apprenticeship” 
that allows for “the steady, incremental development of their individu-
al responsibility.”112 Moral activism not only makes the creation of a 
teaching law firm possible but also teaches, after Watergate, Enron, 
and the recent financial crisis, that it is necessary. 
 
                                                          
111
 Luban has remarked on the origins of the standard conception of lawyering 
as being, in part, from legal education’s theoretical bias towards legal realism. He 
speaks of Oliver Wendell Holmes as “the patriarch of realism” and goes on to state, 
in the words of Roger Cramton, that legal realism is “the ordinary religion of the 
law-school classroom.” LUBAN, supra note 9, at 19, 20. A full discussion of the con-
cept of legal realism is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, I include this 
small paragraph and footnote for the point that this theory, which holds that law in 
action is never a given and is always contestable because it is, ultimately, the law as 
imperfect human beings understand and enforce it, is largely responsible for the 
principles of non-accountability and partisanship that are taught in law schools to-
day. It is only by studying the implications of legal realism and the arguments that 
refute it that future law students and new lawyers can be trained to re-consider the 
standard conception and attempt to adopt a morally activist view. 
112
 Steven Lubet, Like a Surgeon, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1178, 1181 (2003). As 
Lubet goes on to state, “Physicians are purposefully taught to practice their profes-
sion in a way that attorneys are not.” Id. 
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II. THE MEDICAL MODEL: HIGHLIGHTS & APPLICATIONS TO THE LEGAL 
EDUCATION CONTEXT  
 
As a result of the famous 1910 Flexner Report,
113
 medical educa-
tion transformed itself from a fairly hodgepodge collection of appren-
ticeships in hospitals and dispensaries, and lectures in lecture halls to a 
standardized, lengthy, costly, and rigorous path.
114
 That path consists 
of undergraduate medical education, which includes scientific study, 
clinical internships, and post-graduate education consisting primarily 
of residency programs at large teaching hospitals. The development of 
a course of scientific study as a pre-requisite to clinical and post-
graduate residencies developed as scientific research and knowledge 
expanded.
115
  
 
Along with the growth in scientific knowledge, came the public 
realization that doctors had something incredibly important—and in-
creasingly expensive—to offer. There were a series of developments, 
both in medical practice and medical education, which led to an in-
crease in the cost of health care.
116
 These started with the Flexner Re-
port, which resulted in improved medical education and increased pub-
lic confidence in the medical profession as a whole.
117
 However, 
subsequent technological advances in health care also raised health 
care costs both generally and in hospitals, which had traditionally been 
charitable institutions for persons of limited means.
118
 With these 
technological advances, better-trained physicians, and, in the 1930s 
and 1940s, the development of antibiotics, purely charitable institu-
                                                          
113
 See generally ABRAHAM FLEXNER, MEDICAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES AND CANADA: A REPORT TO THE CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, BULLETIN NUMBER FOUR (1910) [hereinafter 
FLEXNER REPORT]. 
114
 See generally ROTHSTEIN, supra note 4; see also Molly Cooke et al.,  Amer-
ican Medical Education 100 Years After the Flexner Report, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED 
1339 (2006) (summarizing the changes in medical education since Flexner’s 1910 
assessment of all medical schools then in operation). 
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 See generally ROTHSTEIN, supra note 4. 
116
 Melissa A. Thomasson, From Sickness to Health: The Twentieth-Century 
Development of U.S. Health Insurance, 39 EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. HIST. 233, 235–
36 (2002). 
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 Id. at 236.  
118
 Id. at 235–36.  
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tions were no longer financially feasible.
119
 As a result, hospitals start-
ed charging patients for the care that they received.
120
  
 
Hospitals developed prepaid health care plans—a precursor to 
modern American health insurance
121
—and the real divide between 
those who could afford health care and those who could not began. 
There was growing recognition that without public support, an increas-
ing number of persons would not be able to afford health care.
122
 In 
addition, there was growing recognition that there was health care 
worth having. Finally, the technological and pharmaceutical advances 
led to public excitement about the possibilities of research. All of this 
led to the public’s willingness to contribute to the ever-growing costs 
of health care. Teaching hospitals, supported in large part by federal 
and state dollars, permitted the on-going excellent training of doctors 
and research scientists while simultaneously ensuring that patients 
without financial means could be seen and treated.
123
 The solution has 
not kept health care costs down and is expensive. However, it has sig-
nificantly positively impacted the issues of doctor training, on-going 
medical discovery and patient access. 
 
As I suggested in the introduction, while there are as many ar-
ticles regarding medical education and how it might be improved as 
there are for legal education, American medical training is considered 
one of the best in the world.
124
 It is clear that the methods of teaching 
theory and practice that are combined in medical education are work-
ing. So, what, precisely are medical educators doing right and how can 
those lessons be applied to legal education? In 2005, Lee Shulman, 
President of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teach-
ing, wrote an article comparing professional pedagogies. As he de-
scribes it, “In professional education, it is insufficient to learn for the 
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 Id. at 236. 
120
 See id. at 236–37. 
121
 Id. at 237. 
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 See generally L.E. Fishman & J.B. Bentley, The Evolution of Support for 
Safety-Net Hospitals, 16 HEALTH AFF. 30 (1997). 
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 Id.  
124
 See QS 2012 World University Rankings by Subject—Medicine, QS TOP 
UNIV., http://www.topuniversities.com/university-rankings/university-subject-
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sake of knowledge and understanding alone; one learns in order to en-
gage in practice.”125 The obvious question, then, is how best to do this. 
 
From the time of the Flexner Report, medical educators have 
agreed that doing medicine is critical to ensuring that students can 
learn best practices for actually engaging in the professional practice 
of medicine. But Flexner did more than simply pronounce the im-
portance of experiential learning. A kind of experiential learning was 
already abundant at the time that he engaged in his comprehensive 
study, in the form of apprenticeships, both formal and informal.
126
 
Flexner, however, recognized that medical education at the time, con-
sisting as it did in an assortment of lectures and apprenticeships, was 
not sufficiently organized scientifically or pedagogically to ensure the 
delivery of quality health care.
127
  
 
As described in a recent article, Flexner criticized, “the medio-
cre quality and profit motive of many schools and teachers . . . and the 
nonscientific approach to preparation for the profession.”128 Flexner 
felt that both “formal analytic reasoning, the kind of thinking integral 
to the natural sciences” and “a clinical phase of education in academi-
cally oriented hospitals, where thoughtful clinicians would pursue re-
search stimulated by the questions that arose in the course of patient 
care and teach their students to do the same” was critical to a complete 
and effective medical education.
129
 The call for formalized analytic 
and comprehensive experiential learning has been repeatedly con-
firmed as a successful pedagogy through research.
130
 
Shulman, writing almost one hundred years after Flexner, notes 
that with professional pedagogies, the attempt is to try to link “key 
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 Lee S. Shulman, Pedagogies of Uncertainty, LIBERAL EDUC., Spring 2005, 
at 18 (emphasis in original). 
126
 ROTHSTEIN, supra note 4, at 115–16. 
127
 Cooke et al., supra note 114, at 1341.  
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 Id. at 1339. 
129
 Id. 
130
 See, e.g., P.W. Teunissen et al., How Residents Learn: Qualitative Evi-
dence for the Pivotal Role of Clinical Activities, 41 MED. EDUC. 763 (2007); see also 
Bard, supra note 104, at 152 (“medical education is based upon evidence found in 
scholarly literature about what does, and what does not, constitute effective teaching 
. . . [c]urriculum development in medical education is a scholarly process that inte-
grates a content area with educational theory and methodology and evaluates its im-
pact . . . they are adopting contemporary best practices in education based on empiri-
cal research.”) (citation omitted).. 
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ideas and effective practice.”131 In other words, professional pedagog-
ies are trying to create the bridge between theory and practice. Shul-
man unpacks these overused concepts, however, in a way that is help-
ful to our understanding of the many facets of what we are trying to 
teach: 
 
. . . [A] true professional does not merely prac-
tice: he or she performs with a sense of personal 
and social responsibility. In the work of a pro-
fessional, the performances of practice must not 
only be skilled and theoretically grounded; they 
must be characterized by integrity, by a com-
mitment to responsible, ethical service.
132
 
 
Ethics, responsibility, and integrity – these sound a lot like val-
ues, like common morality as well as role morality. However, Shul-
man proceeds, “[I]t’s also insufficient to claim that a combination of 
theory, practice, and ethics defines a professional’s work; it is also 
characterized by conditions of inherent and unavoidable uncertain-
ty.”133 Therein lies the strongest argument for the teaching law firm.  
 
Conditions of uncertainty cannot be re-created through the use 
of the hypothetical. A hypothetical client, a hypothetical legal issue, a 
hypothetical ruling by a hypothetical judge are all limited by the con-
straints of the problem set. In the real world, as we well know, uncer-
tainty is a daily, almost hourly, occurrence. A client comes in with a 
problem. It is uncertain what is the best strategy for resolving that 
problem: the client may not have the resources to execute all possible 
strategies; the opposing party may have a great deal of information 
that could change the outcome of the problem; the client may not be 
sharing everything; or the judge that you will be in front of may have 
information of her own that could affect the case. The number of pos-
sible uncertainties in a given real life situation are virtually limitless.  
 
So how, asks Shulman, can a professional address and account 
for all of these uncertainties? Through the exercise of judgment.
134
 
And how does one exercise judgment in an uncertain situation? 
                                                          
131
 Shulman, supra note 125, at 18.  
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Through “cognizance of the consequences of one’s actions” (i.e., expe-
rience).
135
 Certainly, experience can be gained through reading and 
discussing precedents, working as an associate or a clerk in a summer 
or part-time job, being a research assistant, volunteering at a non-profit 
law office, or participating in a clinical program. So, why isn’t this 
enough? Shulman directly compares legal education with medical edu-
cation and concludes: 
 
[L]awyers are not taught to practice; law 
schools are nearly devoid of clinical instruction. 
Law schools do a brilliant job of teaching stu-
dents to think like a lawyer, a marginal job of 
teaching students to practice like a lawyer, and 
a questionable job of teaching them to be pro-
fessionals with a set of values and moral com-
mitments. The pedagogies of medicine, howev-
er, put enormous emphasis on learning to 
practice the profession. Education is a seamless 
continuum in which each segment has conse-
quences for all others.
136
 
 
Certainly, clinical legal education within law schools has ex-
ploded within the last fifteen or twenty years,
137
 so it is perhaps unfair 
to state that law schools are nearly devoid of clinical instruction. Nev-
ertheless, despite the wonderful gains, there remains an un-evenness in 
clinical offerings, a reticence on the part of many law school adminis-
trators to support law clinics and their expansion and division amongst 
law school faculty between podium teachers and clinicians.
138
 Even in 
greatly supportive law school environments, where both kinds of fac-
ulty are treated equally in terms of expectations, salaries, benefits, and 
promotions, there remains a sense that what these two types of faculty 
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Jon C. Dubin & Peter A. Joy, Clinical Legal Edu-
cation for This Millennium: The Third Wave, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 30–32 (2000). 
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do is entirely separate. This division is not a helpful model for future 
lawyers. 
 
As far as Shulman’s last criticism about the teaching of profes-
sionalism, it sounds very similar to the criticism that Luban raised 
about the standard conception of the lawyer role.
139
 In fact, a more ac-
curate characterization of what currently occurs in law school is not a 
failure to teach lawyer values, but rather a failure to teach those values 
within the bigger context of common morality. Graduating law stu-
dents are well aware of the professional values and obligations of loy-
alty, confidentiality, and zeal. As Luban points out, what, they have a 
tremendous amount of difficulty doing, however, is addressing these 
professional values when they come into conflict with common moral-
ity.
140
 It is the process of learning how to identify and address this con-
flict that is critical to making the transformation from thinking like a 
lawyer to exercising the good judgment of a professional lawyer. 
 
Medical education accomplishes the transformative process of 
becoming a professional precisely because of those educators’ under-
standing that “[a]t the center of this pedagogy is the idea of formation: 
the recognition that teaching and learning are about much more than 
transferring facts or even cognitive tools.”141  It is well recognized 
among medical educators that repetitive experiences with multiple pa-
tients provides what Shulman calls the “signature pedagogies” that al-
lows for complex thought as well as mastery of routine procedures.
142
  
In fact, it is precisely the habitual, routinized process of medical 
rounds that provides the mental space to engage in learning about 
more complex patient-related issues.
143
 
 
Clinical law teaching pedagogy similarly advocates for this fo-
cus on the transformative process of learning and the irreplaceable 
value of live client experiences. Clinical education is regarded as a 
method of teaching, rather than as a broad and vague label for any kind 
of hands-on experience. More specifically, it is a method of teaching 
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students “how to learn from experience.”144 While the expense of clin-
ical legal education has been an ongoing criticism, both in financial 
and temporal terms, legal educators have largely embraced its effec-
tiveness in bridging the gap between theory and skills.
145
 
 
There are also ongoing debates about what is most effective: a 
traditional in-house clinic, a field clinic, or an externship in a law of-
fice.
146
 While there is some data available about the effectiveness of 
clinical education and the traditional in-house variety in teaching cer-
tain skills,
147
 there is very little data that provide support for favoring 
one type of experiential learning over another. It makes intuitive sense, 
however, that if we agree that reflection is a key component to learn-
ing how to learn from experience, a hands-on opportunity where there 
are too many cases or a teacher-supervisor who is not reflective herself 
is going to provide less of an educational benefit then would an oppor-
tunity to work with smaller case-loads and appropriately reflective 
teachers. Most educators, however, feel that offering a variety of expe-
riential learning opportunities is good, although schools that seem to 
favor one experiential type over another may suffer criticism from 
clinical teachers. 
 
Regardless of the differences in currently available experiential 
opportunities, it still appears from this review that a great deal is being 
done currently to address the need for transformative educational ex-
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periences in legal education. Why, then, is this not sufficient? There 
are four reasons. 
 
 First, what currently exists is not enough. There are many 
schools that make some form of experiential learning mandatory but 
these are by far the minority of schools.
148
 Additionally, because of the 
costs of clinical education, those schools that do require experiential 
learning treat many different kinds and qualities of experiences as 
equivalent and sufficient.
149
 Finally, even for those fortunate students 
who have the opportunity to enjoy the “Cadillac” clinic experience, 
they do so on a part-time basis, while juggling other classes and part-
time jobs and rarely do so for more than a semester.
150
 Too many law 
students graduate without ever having had one experience with a live 
client. For those that have had these experiences, they are generally 
short-lived. If the idea is to learn from experience, surely the more ex-
perience one has from which to learn, the more effective one will be! 
This is certainly what medical education research has taught us. 
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Second, there is no substitute for seeing the standard concep-
tion of lawyering in action and using theories of moral activism to 
challenge that conception and learn to identify and address role con-
flicts. As we have seen, assisting a client in resolving a problem, re-
gardless of the nature of the problem and the strategy being consid-
ered, has ramifications that not only must be identified but also are 
often not easily addressed.
151
 Experience in the field not only helps re-
inforce classroom learning about ethics, it also provides the habit of 
solving problems ethically. 
 
Third, the reach of Legal Services Corporation lawyers is lim-
ited.  Admittedly, they have helped thousands of low income Ameri-
cans and have done so often in near impossible conditions: with no re-
sources for hiring experts or getting the latest technology, in shrinking 
offices with little to no administrative support.
152
 They have shoul-
dered unimaginably enormous and complex caseloads for very little 
compensation. They are, for many, modern day heroes. However, the 
unremitting dwindling of government support resulting in increasingly 
restricted work and continuously shrinking budgets is crippling and 
rendering them ineffective.
153
 Creating a teaching law firm the size of 
a teaching hospital, where most of the law schools’ graduates will 
handle between three and five low-income cases per rotation, would 
provide the large-scale effort necessary to seriously address this issue. 
A teaching law firm could renew the possibility of equal access to jus-
tice while simultaneously ensuring that all lawyers are fulfilling their 
duty to be actively engaged in providing such access. 
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Fourth and finally, while law students can practice in many 
arenas under certain circumstances under state student practice 
rules,
154
 they cannot practice in any arena. Law students have not, after 
all, completed their legal education prior to taking on the enormous re-
sponsibility for preventing a client from becoming homeless, repre-
senting an abused child or assisting a disabled client from getting des-
perately needed income benefits. Despite these limitations, as is seen 
by the large variety of growing clinical programs and literature, tradi-
tional clinical legal education, prior to graduation from law school, is 
very effective. For that reason, and for reasons similar to the justifica-
tions for the clinical model in medical education, I do not propose re-
placing undergraduate clinical legal education with the graduate teach-
ing law firm. Adding a post-graduate teaching law firm, however, 
would ensure that the vast number of low-income persons receiving 
free representation would be represented by J.D.s rather than law stu-
dents. 
 
For all of these reasons, my proposal does not involve simply 
creating either a traditional law firm or a traditional legal aid office 
and forcing students to practice within it. I have had the experiences of 
supervising law students as a staff attorney in a traditional legal aid of-
fice, teaching law students in a field clinic that resembled my supervi-
sory experience but added a seminar component that I also taught, su-
pervising a student in an externship, and teaching a traditional in-
house clinic. Between the extensive research that has already been 
done and my own personal experiences, I am convinced that a teaching 
law firm that does not provide support for true clinical teaching meth-
odology will not create effective lawyers.
155
  
If we are to truly learn from our mistakes and our own experi-
ences as educators, an effective teaching law firm will provide support 
for low case-loads for students, traditional scholarship for the lawyer-
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professors, and ongoing reflection meetings that provide students with 
the opportunity to continually engage in collegial consultation about 
how various situations were handled as well as how various situations 
should be handled. For this type of experience, in addition to looking 
at our own history and variety of experiential opportunities, the teach-
ing hospital is an excellent model. 
 
III. PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ACCESS TO JUSTICE ISSUE AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CREATION OF A TEACHING LAW FIRM  
 
Having made the case in Part I that lawyers’ “special responsi-
bility to the quality of justice” includes actively addressing the access 
to justice issue,
156
 the question remains whether there are sufficient 
grounds for society in general to take responsibility for addressing this 
issue. Given that the justification for the necessity of the people’s law-
yer is political, rather than moral, it seems clear that the answer is yes.  
 
Our system of government is premised on the notion of equali-
ty before the law. While practically speaking an impoverished person 
can physically walk into a courthouse and be heard by a judge, we 
have known since Gideon v. Wainwright
157
 that such physical access 
will rarely, if ever, result in any meaningful ability to defend oneself or 
obtain requested relief.  
 
Our refusal to ensure legal representation in civil contexts, 
however, is not because of a feeling that in those contexts unrepresent-
ed folks are better able to make their case than in the criminal one. Ra-
ther, the refusal is based on the belief that in the civil context, as mat-
ters are brought by private parties, the indigent litigant is not forced to 
prosecute or defend her claims against the awesome power of the state. 
The right to counsel in the criminal context, as well as many other im-
portant rights, is more about concern for balance when the adversary is 
the government then it is about particularized concern for the indigent 
litigant.
158
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 I am summarizing here what Luban compellingly shows in great detail over 
the course of several chapters, that “criminal defense is an exceptional part of the le-
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As Luban highlights, however, the lesson of Gideon is not only 
about the need to guard against the awesome power of the state. The 
decision also teaches that meaningful access to the legal system is not 
access to a courtroom without knowledge of the workings of the court-
room, the details of the laws being applied there, and an understanding 
of those details.
159
  
 
Pepper articulates this point as well in describing his theory of 
first-class citizenship. As he explains,  
 
[I]n a highly legalized society such as ours, au-
tonomy is often dependent upon access to the 
law. Put simply, first-class citizenship is de-
pendent on access to the law. And while access 
to law . . . is formally available to all, in reality 
it is available only through a lawyer.
160
  
 
Since equal access to the law is one legitimizing principle, denying 
that access by refusing to ensure legal representation for all de-
legitimizes the government. The interest in ensuring a legitimate gov-
ernment, that is one that will not generate a right of resistance, is not 
only an interest for lawyers. Hence, the responsibility to ensure equal 
access to justice is a public one. 
 
Why does this matter? For economic reasons. Law schools 
alone cannot fund a proposal as extensive as a large-scale post-
graduate teaching law firm. In the introduction to this paper, I men-
tioned the increasing drum-beat about law school failures after the 
economic crisis. As one law professor has recently stated, “The eco-
nomic model of law schools is broken. The cost of a legal education 
today is substantially out of proportion to the economic opportunities 
obtained by the majority of graduates.”161The numbers of new law 
schools accredited by the ABA has steadily risen, flooding the market 
with new lawyers while the market for lawyer jobs has steadily 
                                                                                                                                         
to lawyers, knowledge, technology and the politically powerful is certainly as terrify-
ing, if not more so, then the government. Id. at 64–65. Given this reality, the justifi-
cation of limiting free lawyers to indigent criminal defendants is quite weak. For our 
purposes, however, whether or not the litigant opposing an indigent is large and 
powerful has no bearing on the reality of the complexities of our justice system.  
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 Id. at 245. 
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 Pepper, supra note 19, at 617 (internal citations omitted). 
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shrunk.
162
 Given the tuition increases, more scrutiny than ever before 
is being given to the traditional three-year law school model. Law 
school graduates and critics of the current law school educational sys-
tem have been asking increasingly whether the same things can be ac-
complished in less time and for less money.
163
 
 
 Perhaps the answer is yes. But my proposal implicitly deals 
with the effectiveness question, which is not something that can be 
dealt with by simply throwing away all of the important theoretical 
and clinical teaching that is currently happening. It also deals with the 
access to justice issue, something that none of the current outcries ad-
dress, other than to notice the vast number of law graduates without 
jobs and the even vaster number of low-income persons without access 
to legal representation. In sticking with these two issues, then, I will 
not comment on the question of what undergraduate legal education 
should look like other than to suggest that some combination of theo-
retical and clinical teaching similar to what currently exists be re-
tained. 
 
My proposal of the graduate teaching law firm comes from a 
growing belief that whatever forms of undergraduate legal education 
are undertaken, it is not enough to accomplish the twin goals of teach-
ing professionalism, as that term has been defined and analyzed by 
Shulman, and addressing the access to justice issue. Bridging the gap 
between theory and practice; forming deliberative habits of identify-
ing, assessing, and addressing role conflicts and seriously and signifi-
cantly addressing the access to justice issue are things better accom-
plished at the post-graduate level, as we have seen with medical 
education. Meeting these goals should be a societal as well as a lawyer 
imperative. And if that is true, then government funding should play a 
large role in legal education.  
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of-law-school/. 
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Here, it is necessary to pause a moment to acknowledge that in 
the midst of an economic crisis affecting the world, the nation, and the 
legal market, including law schools, I am proposing a commitment of 
more funds rather than a scaling back. My response to this predictable 
criticism is to look at other moments of economic crises in our histo-
ry—and governmental response.  
 
There are many sources, the most obvious to me being Presi-
dent Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s response to the Great Depression 
and President Obama’s response to the current financial crisis. Econ-
omists and politicians alike debate whether these government spending 
responses were the right responses to make, whether they were effec-
tive or whether austerity was the more logical and appropriate re-
sponse, and some even say that the large scale spending that did take 
place was not nearly sufficient and should have even been greater than 
it was. I am clearly not going to be able to resolve these debates within 
this paper. I raise them as a reference point merely to show that while 
there is a significant amount of scholarship on both sides of the issue, 
my proposal is in line with the literature that suggests that economic 
crises require more spending, not less.
164
 
 
I said in the beginning of the paper that I would devote this 
section to economic and practical considerations. Here I would like to 
do just that by discussing the detailed vision of my teaching law firm 
and how, beyond government contributions and addressing the moral 
dimensions of lawyering, it can be sustained and remain practically en-
riching. 
 
You will recall that one of the early and frequent criticisms of 
even attempting to discuss a teaching law firm like a teaching hospital 
is that law and medicine are not truly analogous. More specifically, 
poor people have the same anatomy, circular, and vascular systems as 
wealthy people because they are human beings. Therefore, medical 
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residents who treat primarily low-income patients will learn just as 
much as if they were treating all wealthy patients. All of their 
knowledge will be transferable to any practice they choose because 
diseases and injuries do not discriminate between rich and poor.  
 
Legal problems, however, most certainly do. Thus, a legal resi-
dent completing rotations in, for example, landlord-tenant law, mort-
gage foreclosure defense, and social security disability income benefit 
appeals will not be well equipped to land a post-residency job in a 
large law firm representing a multi-million dollar corporation; neither 
will a lawyer completing an immigration rotation, a family law rota-
tion, or a rotation dealing with debtor-side consumer issues. These are 
fair criticisms.  
 
I therefore suggest as a response to these criticisms, as well as 
a possible source of funding contribution, that rotations in real estate, 
corporate merger, tax, and many other traditionally private firm con-
texts be part of our teaching law firm. And before it is predictably 
cried, “But then what of the access to justice mission?” I suggest that 
all rotations be considered as potential links in a chain of specializa-
tion. 
 
 So, for example, all residents would be required to represent 
low-income clients in at least one-third of their total rotations. Resi-
dents with an interest in private practice real estate would do their low-
income rotation representing low-income tenants and low-income 
homeowners in mortgage foreclosure matters. However, they could al-
so do rotations in real estate, tax, and even small business representa-
tion. Similarly, residents wanting to specialize in international business 
could include low-income rotations in immigration and could also do 
rotations in international business, small business, tax, or other related 
legal fields. Clients seeking representation in the private rotations 
would pay sliding scale rates and those fees would be used to support 
the work of the firm. Clinical professor advisors could assist students 
in creating a series of related rotations that would ready them for a 
specialized practice in an area of interest. 
 
 
 Foreseeable complications would be conflicts of interest and 
opposition from the private bar. As for the former, depending on the 
level of conflict, a “Chinese wall” would suffice; however in others, 
where an opposing party is low income, the paying client would have 
Miller-Wilson 7/11/2013  4:11 PM 
100 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL 13:1 
to find representation elsewhere. Regarding the latter complication, I 
think the response is to think realistically about whether truly threaten-
ing competition would exist from a teaching law firm. 
 
 As a teaching law firm, first and foremost, no lawyer resident 
would have more than approximately three clients at a time. Second, 
as the private rotations would be for those students that want to spe-
cialize in that particular area, not all lawyer residents would rotate 
through each private area, which again would limit the number of ac-
tual clients served. Third, similar again to teaching hospitals, teaching 
law firms would develop their own specialty identities. For example, a 
Gary, Indiana teaching law firm might have many rotations that could 
lead to specialties in tax and real estate offerings but very little in the 
way of international business offerings. Thus, a lawyer in private prac-
tice would easily be able to find clients needing representation in spe-
cialty areas not taught by that area’s teaching law firm. Finally, a 
teaching law firm of the scale that I envision becomes, in and of itself, 
a job creator rather than something that threatens law jobs.  
 
These arguments, I believe, take care of the concerns about the 
ability to use teaching hospitals as adequately analogous models for 
teaching law firms. One other distinction, which only helps the eco-
nomic concerns, is the fact that law firms will have nowhere near the 
costs associated with the equipment and laboratory needs that teaching 
hospitals do. Other than computers, printers, and photocopiers, law 
firms don’t need expensive equipment. On the whole, while grand and 
expensive in terms of person costs, teaching law firms should be 
cheaper than teaching hospitals. 
 
Another consideration is the combination of breadth and depth 
of experiences that teaching law firms would offer. First, because all 
residents would be required to rotate through two or three poverty law 
rotations, those residents who also choose private practice rotations 
would have the opportunity to see the issues from both sides as well as 
the opportunity to gain live client experiences in fields that might only 
be tangentially related to their ultimate chosen fields. This could great-
ly enhance their ability to practice in their chosen fields. 
 
As an example, consider a resident who provides social securi-
ty benefit income representation during their first year of residency 
and then ultimately goes on to do personal injury work. As a direct re-
sult of the social security work that the resident did, the resident will 
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understand that when representing a plaintiff whose sole source of in-
come is social security benefits, it is likely that prior to any settlement 
or resolution of the personal injury action a special needs trust will 
have to be created or the plaintiff will lose her benefits upon receipt of 
the personal injury action proceeds. Similarly, a resident in a family 
law rotation will have a much greater understanding of the implica-
tions of divorce when later specializing in bankruptcy or tax law. 
 
A final practical consideration is the chance that teaching law 
firms offer to assist law students in gaining expertise with local rules 
and connections to local practices. If my vision were to be realized, a 
teaching law firm with a focus on a legal area that the resident lawyer 
was interested in, which was also geographically situated in a place 
that the resident lawyer wanted to ultimately practice upon completion 
of the residency program, would not only provide the resident lawyer 
with the certifications that she wanted but also with invaluable famili-
arity and experience with local players and local practice rules and 
customs. 
 
 In order to have this possibility, it is part of my vision that 
many future lawyers would choose to attend two different legal educa-
tion institutions: a more traditional law school and a post-J.D. teaching 
law firm affiliated with a law school different from the one which they 
attended. In that way, law schools could retain their unique identities, 
class sizes, and faculty, and then create an affiliated teaching law firm 
that would gradually, over time, build reputations in specialties that 
might or not be similar to those for which the law schools have reputa-
tions. Students would seek admissions to a residency program at a par-
ticular teaching law firm based on their own interests, perceptions of 
the law firm’s reputation, and geographic preferences. Admissions to 
the residency programs would be competitive in the same way that 
they are for admissions to medical school residency programs, and the 
possibility of joining a residency program in the state where you ulti-
mately intend to practice could introduce the possibility of significant-
ly reducing the need for a bar exam. 
 
Bar examinations are traditionally exams created by states in 
an effort to ensure that those licensed in the particular state meet the 
state’s standards. Much has been written about the lack of worthiness 
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of these exams of acting as any kind of quality control mechanism.
165
 
Actually and successfully representing clients, and therefore clearly 
having significant knowledge and understanding of that state’s rules 
and procedures, could not be better evidence that the resident in ques-
tion is qualified for a license in that state.  
 
Certainly there will be instances where a lawyer licensed in one 
state wishes to move to and practice in another or where a lawyer at-
tends a residency program in one state but ultimately for a host of rea-
sons, desires to practice in another. For those attorneys, the states will 
presumably retain their traditional licensing procedures. But for the 
lawyers, presumably the vast majority, who participate in a residency 
program in the state where they ultimately practice, the bar exam re-
quirement could be eliminated. Instead, evidence of successful com-
pletion of the residency program could be presented in exchange for a 
law license. The law school affiliated with that teaching law firm and 
the state could determine what evidence would be sufficient. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Creating teaching law firms modeled after teaching hospitals, is not a 
new idea.
166
 In fact, a move in this direction has already been under-
taken by Arizona State University.
167
 Nevertheless, the concerns and 
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criticisms regarding the economic feasibility of such firms and precise-
ly how they would function given the imprecise analogy between 
health care and legal assistance are valid. Addressing those concerns 
and criticisms fully requires a discussion of the goals of a teaching law 
firm.  
 
As I have argued, while there are many practical benefits, the 
goals of my proposed teaching law firm are to respond to broader and 
more deeply troubling ethical concerns about lawyering in general and 
to the crisis in access to justice that is of central concern to our democ-
racy. Consideration of a re-conception of the lawyering idiom holds a 
great deal of promise for resolving these issues. 
 
                                                                                                                                         
Quinney College of Law in Utah also sees their new building as providing them with 
the opportunity to “create a teaching hospital for law.” See College of Law Finalizes 
Plans for New Building, ULAWTODAY, http://today.law.utah.edu/2013/01/college-of-
law-finalizes-plans-for-new-building/, (last visited Apr. 22, 2013).  
 
 
